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The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) is a global agreement 
between 194 countries to stabilize greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere to 
avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Through this 
Convention, developed countries have also agreed to provide developing countries with 
funds to both reduce greenhouse gas emissions (mitigate) and build resilience to the 
current and anticipated changes in average climate conditions (adaptation). This thesis is 
centered on financing for adaptation to climate change. While there are several funds 
administered by a UNFCCC-appointed institute, the World Bank recently launched 
Climate Investment Funds as an interim mechanism (set to expire in 2012, when the 
existing UNFCCC financial architecture is to be revised) for providing, among other 
things, adaptation finance in selected developing countries. This thesis will explore the 
opportunities and challenges for adaptation financing under the Climate Investment 
Funds (CIF), as compared to the UNFCCC. Document analysis and two rounds of 
interviews were done to generate information to assess the ability of the CIF to respond 
to the needs of adaptation financing and to fetch the institutional and governance issues 
that arise from the involvement of a World Bank-administered fund, namely CIF, in the 
climate finance regime. It was concluded that while there are some achievements with the 
CIF exercise, there are also significant institutional, governance and funding challenges 
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This thesis will explore the opportunities and challenges for adaptation financing under 
the World Bank‘s Climate Investment Funds (CIF), as compared to the UN‘s body for 
climate change (UN Framework Convention for Climate Change). As climate change has 
already begun to take a toll on the world‘s ecosystems and their associated human and 
animal populations – a situation which will only intensify in future – the need to adapt to 
climate change has become even more urgent. With developed countries responsible for 
the largest share of greenhouse gas emissions to date, and the comparatively higher 
degree of vulnerability of developing countries to the impacts of climate change, coupled 
with their limited capacity to individually respond to these impacts, international action 
to address inequities between developed and developing countries is required. This was 
one of the key considerations while fashioning the UN‘s Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, which also outlined a financial mechanism for 
transferring resources from developed to developing countries (Article 11, 1992). More 
recently, the World Bank has tried to ―play its part‖ by developing a separate avenue for 
channeling resources towards climate change mitigation and adaptation, namely the 
Climate Investment Funds (CIF). Given this, there are crucial institutional, governance 
and funding issues for the CIF, which will be examined in this thesis.     
 
1.1 The Adaptation Imperative  
 
The recent floods in Pakistan forced 20 million people out of their houses and killed 
about 1600 people (Gronewald & Climatewire, 2010). Australia‘s wild forest fires are 
feared to become even more frequent in the coming years (Walsh, 2009). Each year, 
environmental disasters poke us with a bitter reality – climate has altered appreciably due 
to anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and it has impacts on human 
populations. Therefore, it is vital to adapt. Thankfully, international attitude towards 
climate change has altered significantly, from a time when some lead champions of 
addressing climate change, like Al Gore, labeled it as a ―lazy‖ or ―soft‖ approach to a 
time when it is agreed that adaptation to climate change is an imperative that can not be 
delayed (Rogers, 1998).  
 
Adaptation forms a vital component of the climate change response system on many 
grounds. First, it is realized that despite all mitigation efforts, some level of climate 
change is inevitable (Parry, Canziani, Palutikof, van der Linden, & Hanson, 2007), and 
ultimately, adaptation to this change will be necessary. Second, climate change may 
occur in a sudden and unforeseeable, rather than gradual and predictable manner. Hence, 
anticipatory measures to prepare for such change will be important. On a local scale, 
adaptation can beneficial at multiple levels. Fruits of adaptation actions are local and 
more immediately apparent than those of mitigation. Moreover, the linkages between 
adaptation and development can be exploited to create win-win solutions that abate 
climate risks and attain sustainable development objectives (Huq & Reid, 2004). In 
addition, adaptation responds to climate change in a selective manner – it capitalizes on 
the positive and decreases negative impacts (Pary et.al., 2007). Finally, adaptation efforts 





(McCarthy, 2001). While international understanding and attitudes have considerably 
evolved, much more work remains pending to pave way for a successful international 
adaptation response.  
 
A sense of the challenge confronting the international community can be appreciated by 
looking at the numbers. There are several estimates of adaptation costs in developing 
countries, all employing separate methodologies and containing different degrees of 
uncertainties and errors.  The UNFCCC points to a need for USD 28 – 67 billion per year 
by 2030 (UNFCCC, 2008). In comparison, the collective multilateral funds for adaptation 
provided by the UNFCCC (through Adaptation Fund (AF), Least Developed Countries 
Fund (LDCF), Strategic Climate Change Fund (SCCF), and the Global Environment 
Facility-Strategic of Adaptation (GEF-SPA)) and the World Bank
1
 (through Climate 
Investment Funds) amount to merely USD 1.6 billion. Accordingly, the latter sum needs 
to multiplied about 40 times in less than 20 years.  
 
1.2 Climate Investment Funds 
 
The CIF were launched on July 1
st
, 2008 as an ―interim mechanism‖ to enhance financial 
resources for climate change and demonstrate what can be achieved through ―scaled-up 
measures‖ (Climate Investment Funds [CIF], n.d.a). As of September 2008, USD 6.1 
billion had been pledged by donor countries to the Fund, which makes the CIF a 
substantial contributor to the global financial resources for climate change. The CIF 
operates two separate funds – the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) and the Strategic 
Climate Fund (SCF). The CTF finances mitigation efforts and aims to accelerate 
transition to a low carbon economy by facilitating deployment of low carbon 
technologies in developing countries (CIF, 2008b). The SCF is relatively broad and 
supports three different programs: Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR), Forest 
Investment Program (FIP), and the Scaling-up Renewable Energy Program (SREP) (CIF, 
n.d.a). Of these three, only the PPCR is dedicated to adaptation efforts. The objective of 
the PPCR is to finance development and implementation of ―country-led‖ national 
resiliency plans. This Program is designed to demonstrate how climate resilience 
strategies can be incorporated into national developmental plans (CIF, n.d.b). To this end, 
the Program will select 5-10 countries, at least one of which will be from the Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS). Furthermore, it is intended that the PPCR will complement 
existing adaptation funds under the UNFCCC (CIF, n.d.b). Of the USD 6.1 billion 
pledged to CIF, USD 972 million are promised to the PPCR (CIF, 2010b).   
 
1.3 The UNFCCC 
 
With growing scientific understanding and the subsequent political recognition of the 
impacts of global greenhouse emissions in the atmosphere, in 1992, the international 
community ratified a UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) – a global 
                                               
1 The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, administered by the World Bank, is set-up to 
help developing countries integrate disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation into country 
development strategies. The fund has a modest size with pledges worth over USD 258 million (Global 





agreement between 194 countries to stabilize greenhouse gas concentration in the 
atmosphere to avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system 
(UNFCCC, 2009a). The objective of the Convention is to stabilize emissions at a 
perceived safe level in the atmosphere. Although adaptation is mentioned as an important 
tactic for climate change in the Convention, it is not presented as the focal response 
measure in the same the way that mitigation is. However, over the years, during 
UNFCCC negotiations among ratifying countries, the necessity of adaptation has been 
highlighted, as well as the need to pursue both mitigation and adaptation to climate 
change in a balanced manner. 
 
In addition to the underlying objective of stabilizing emissions, the Text of the UNFCCC 
outlines a number of principles. Amongst these is the requirement that developed 
countries are to admit their historic role in contributing to greenhouse gas emissions, and 
in accordance with the polluter pays principle, transfer financial and technological aid to 
developing countries to both mitigate and adapt to climate change. The Convention also 
recognizes the particular vulnerability of developing countries – especially the least 
developed countries, small island countries, and the excessively natural-resource 
dependent developing countries – to the impacts of climate change and variability, and 
their lower capacity to mitigate and adapt to climate change. Hence, the global action to 
climate change must adhere to the ―common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities‖ principle, by which aid is to be transferred from developed (with 
greater responsibility for emissions and capabilities for action) to developing (with lower 
responsibility for emissions and capabilities for action) countries. The Text also stresses 
the importance of developed countries to act first, in terms of reducing greenhouse 
emissions and transferring financial and technological resources to developing countries, 
as the effectiveness of developing countries to implement their commitments under the 
Convention will hinge upon this. Further, this aid must be ―new and additional‖ and 
―adequate and predictable‖ (Article 4.3, UNFCCC, 1992). The UNFCCC is headed by 
the Conference of Parties (COP) – a body of 195
2
 members who have ratified the 
UNFCCC. It is supported by a UNFCCC secretariat that sits in Bonn, Germany and 
adheres to the United Nations rules and regulations in conducting its operations. The 
financial mechanism of the UNFCCC is administered by the Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF), whose operations in the climate change focal area are fully accountable to 
the COP. The COP provides regular guidance to the GEF on policies, programs priorities, 
and eligibility criteria for funding, and the GEF reports annually to the COP. In 2012, 
when the COP is due to produce a second series of legally binding commitments on 
mitigation targets, there is also hope to amend the UNFCCC financial architecture, so 
that it can handle the larger amounts of resources that are necessary for climate change.  
 
1.4 Adaptation Finance  
 
The UNFCCC estimates the additional annual global cost of adaptation to be in tens of 
billions of dollars by 2030; the United Nations Development Program‘s 2007/2008 
Human Development Report provides a more precise number – 86 billion dollars per year 
                                               
2 This compromises of 194 States and one regional economic integration organization, namely the 





by 2015. Regrettably, the collective multilateral aid for adaptation fall grossly short 
(UNFCCC, 2008). Clearly, one of the most obvious needs of adaptation finance is the 
urgency to boost funding. However, adaptation funds must be raised, managed and 
disbursed in accordance to sound principles, which cater to the challenges posed by 
adaptation. These include taking into account that adaptation to climate change is 
strongly linked with development, and therefore an integrated and holistic approach to 
adaptation is the most appropriate. The GEF administers three climate funds, with a 
varying degree of focus on adaptation: GEF-Strategic Priority for Adaptation (GEF-
SPA), which support pilot projects that must be integrated into national policy and should  
demonstrate the development of full-scale projects from adaptation plans; Least 
Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) that supports 49 least developed countries in 
preparing national plans for adaptation; and the Special Climate Change Fund, whose 
objective is to increase the resilience of national development sectors to the impacts of 
climate change, but which supports a variety of activities that are arguably not directly 
related to this objective (like helping fossil fuel-exporting countries diversify their 
economies)
3
 (Huq & Burton, 2003 & Moore Raweston, personal communication, 
November 4
th
, 2010).  There is another fund under the auspices of the UNFCCC, the 
Adaptation Fund, which is administered separately from GEF, by the Adaptation Fund 
Board. This fund was established by the UNFCCC‘s Kyoto Protocol (that legally binds 
industrialized countries to curtail their emissions) and supports a range of adaptation 
activities. Finally, another major multilateral resource for adaptation is the PPCR window 
of the CIF, which exceeds the collective sum of all UNFCCC funds (see Figure 6.4)  
 
1.5 Research Focus  
 
This thesis is centered on one aspect of the adaptation response – financing. It will 
explore the various needs of adaptation finance, and particularly, assess the ability of a 
new climate fund, the Climate Investment Funds, to deliver on these needs. The CIF are a 
major initiative of the World Bank that are more recent but much larger than the 
adaptation funds of the UNFCCC. While the CIF have a bigger magnitude, their mandate 
is questionable – will they deliver on the important dimensions of adaptation financing? 
Further, many civil society groups and some developing countries have already indicted 
the CIF as a donor-driven attempt to hijack the inclusive and transparent multilateral 
process towards a future climate financing regime, which would give adaptation its due 
considerations. This thesis will examine the validity of these accusations, by examining 
the influence of the CIF on the UNFCCC (Tan, 2008). 
 
1.6 Research Questions and Rationales 
  
The research question guiding this thesis is: What are the challenges and the 
opportunities facing adaptation financing under the CIF as compared to UNFCCC? 
The research realizes that the CIF is not altogether an alternate process for international 
                                               
3 The GEF Trust Fund is the central fund established to aid developing countries and economies in 
transition to implement their commitments under the Accord and contribute to the overall objective of the 
Accord. The fund supports adaptation and mitigation projects; however, only 1.5% or USD 13.7 million 





action on climate change, and that, as the CIF documents (CIF, n.d.a, CIF, n.d.b) assert, 
this World-Bank administered financial mechanism contributes to the larger debates and 
activities occurring in the UNFCCC. However, what will be examined is the nature of 
contribution that the CIF can make – will they bring a useful experience or not to the 
UNFCCC? Will they impede progress or undermine the multilateral process of 
developing a new financial mechanism under the UNFCCC? How similar or different 
will the CIF be from other UNFCCC funds, and whether they will repeat past mistakes or 
offer new solutions? What new features of aid effectiveness will the CIF experiment 
with?  
  
There are two components to the overarching research question – one, the response of the 
CIF to the needs of adaptation finance – that is, how much funding is required and for 
what purposes; and two, the institutional and governance issues that emerge from the 
relationship between the UNFCCC and the CIF as channels of adaptation funds – that is, 
how does decision-making take place and what is the institutional framework within 
which those decisions are made. It is important to point out here that there is a 
considerable overlap between the institutional, governance and funding issues that will be 
discussed.  
 
Figure 1.1 Dimensions of the Research Question 
 
 
Therefore, from the aforementioned overarching research question, two following sub-
questions will be investigated, with an aim to examine the possible impacts of Climate 
Investment Funds on adaptation finance in general, and on the UNFCCC‘s progress 
towards a new financial architecture for climate change in 2012: 
 
1. What are the needs of adaptation finance? (Funding Issues) 
Debates on how climate finance for adaptation should be raised, administered and 
disbursed are as old as the Convention. However, the knowledge in this area has also 
evolved over time, and it is important to know what the international community 
currently deems is necessary for adaptation. This information can be used to evaluate 
the response of the CIF to the needs of adaptation, and their potential to provide 






2. How do the UNFCCC and CIF address adaptation? (Institutional and 
Governance Issues) 
There are fundamental gaps in the way adaptation finance is currently mobilized, 
administered and disbursed. Literature points to a number of flaws in the current 
UNFCCC financial architecture administered by the GEF. In light of new financial 
architecture for climate change, it is important to review the drawbacks in the old 
financial mechanism so that past mistakes are not repeated. On the other hand, with a 
budget of USD 6.1 billion, the CIF can be of great assistance to the UNFCCC 
process by narrowing the gap between the need and availability of funds for 
adaptation. However, it remains to be seen whether the CIF may amend, replicate, or 
supplement existing problems, and in doing so, whether they will undermine the 
UNFCCC‘s progress towards an improved financial mechanism. This will ultimately 
depend on how the CIF raise, channel and disburse these funds.  
 
It will also depend on the governance (decision-making) rules and structures of the 
CIF, especially the way in which they distribute power among different stakeholders 
(developed and developing countries and civil society organizations) and among key 
institutes of climate finance (power is indirectly through institutes through their daily 
management and operations of the fund).  
 
A close examination of both adaptation finance under the UNFCCC‘s financial 
mechanism (including the Adaptation Fund) and CIF can elucidate the interaction 
between, and effectiveness of these two institutes as the main financial bodies for 
adaptation to climate change. The institutional interplay between these two will help 
determine the capability of the CIF to provide adaptation finance.  
 
 
1.7 Research Significance 
 
While many civil society organizations have raised voices against the CIF (Tan, 2008), 
this thesis will be one of the first in-depth studies to assess the challenges and 
opportunities confronting CIF adaptation financing. Hence, this thesis will be a useful 
contribution to the literature on multilateral finance for climate change and the CIFs in 
particular. Further, the emergence of the CIF raises some serious questions about its 
impacts on the overall aid available for adaptation and on the multilateral process under 
the UNFCCC. There are several reasons for these concerns as outlined below. 
 
Funding Issues 
1. The CIF may not create any new and additional resources for climate change. 
Since the donor countries for UNFCCC and CIF are the same, there are concerns 
that some of these countries may transfer their aid money to the CIF, given that 
they may exercise more control over the flow of resources in the CIF. 
Furthermore, countries may also shift money from their Official Development 





2. The CIF may not create adequate and predictable resources. The contributions to 
the CIF, like to the UNFCCC funds, are made on a voluntary basis.  
3. The CIF may not create significant resources for adaptation. Of the USD 6.1 
billion pledged, the adaptation component of the CIF – the Pilot Program for 
Climate Resilience (PPCR) – received only USD 972 million (CIF, 2010b). 
Furthermore, the CIF permits donor countries to utilize their contributions from 
the PPCR for other climate related programs (CIF, 2008a & CIF, 2008b)  
 
Institutional and Governance Issues 
1. There are concerns over the governance mechanisms of these funds. While the 
UNFCCC funds are governed by a transparent and strong multilateral body, there 
are doubts if a similar governance framework exists for the CIF.  
2. The CIF may undermine the multilateral process under the UNFCCC. While the 
World Bank has declared the CIF to be an interim mechanism (CIF, 2008a & CIF, 
2008b) and included a Sunset clause in its governance framework documents 
(CIF, 2008a & CIF, 2008b) to terminate the CIF once a new financial architecture 
is developed under the UNFCCC regime, it neither provides rationales for its 
standpoint for a financial mechanism outside the UNFCCC and administered by 
the World Bank, nor an exact termination date for its activities. 
3. The World Bank has a poor track record of funding development activities that 
have been especially detrimental to the environment. This makes it difficult for 
some countries and NGOs to trust the World Bank with a considerable sum of 
money for climate change, and raises questions as to how differently will the new 
World Bank funds be administered and used (Tan, 2008). 
4. The CIF may duplicate some weaknesses of the UNFCCC. A number of flaws are 
identified in the UNFCCC aid architecture, for example, the contributions to the 
funds are made on a voluntary basis, the process for applying for adaptation funds 
is tedious, etc. There are concerns that the CIF may not implement adequate 
measures to avert these flaws.  
5. A preliminary analysis indicates that the process of applying for funds in the 
UNFCCC and the CIF is very similar – developing countries partner with the 
same multilateral institutes to prepare proposals for obtaining adaptation funds. 
Moreover, the UNFCCC extensively involves the World Bank in its funding 
process. Therefore, it is unclear what the motives of the World Bank are in 
devising a new fund, in stead of helping amend the existing ones under UNFCCC 
(UNFCCC, n.d.a., CIF, 2008a & CIF, 2008b).  
 
1.8 Research Hypothesis 
 
For the aforementioned reasons, I make the following hypotheses: 
The CIF have the potential to:  
1. Lower multilateral aid for adaptation projects, as donor countries may shift money 
from adaptation to mitigation projects as permitted by the CIF (Clause 46, CIF, 
2008a).     
2. Undermine the multilateral process under UNFCCC, as donor countries will favor 





3. Only promote the weaknesses of UNFCCC funds, as CIF will introduce no new 
mechanisms of addressing some of the problems identified with the UNFCCC 
funds. 
 
The possibility that the CIF can have negligible or neutral influence on the UNFCCC 
process is discounted because the motivations and objectives of both the CIF and the 
UNFCCC funds are the same – to facilitate adaptation to climate change in the 
developing countries, and in doing so allow countries to fulfill their commitments under 
the Convention. Moreover, the mechanisms of the funds under both institutes are similar 
in many ways, for example, same donor and recipient countries are targeted; same 
implementing agencies assist developing countries in procuring the funds.   
  
1.9 Thesis Outline 
 
After a discussion on the methods employed for the study in Chapter 2, the next three 
sections are divided according to the sub-questions discussed in section 1.6. Chapter 3 
describes the UNFCCC process and its provisions for adaptation finance, Chapter 4 
presents the CIF, highlighting salient features of these funds and Chapter 5 outlines the 
needs of adaptation financing. Information from these chapters, alongside responses from 






























2.1 Exploratory Study 
 
Since the CIF have not been examined in their potential to contribute to adaptation needs 
and a future adaptation finance mechanism under the UNFCCC, this will be an 
exploratory study. The distinguishing feature of an exploratory problem is that there is a 
lack of prior knowledge available. Henceforth, the objective of exploratory research is ―to 
cast a wide net‖ (Putt & Springer, 1989), i.e. to ensure that a broad understanding of the 
problem is constructed. Exploratory work occurs in the beginning stages of policy 
formulation, and seeks to capture the scope, dimensions and the magnitude of the issue. 
Such a study would attempt to define the issue and chart out any emerging controversies, 
trends and themes. However, exploratory research does not narrowly focus on a particular 
detail of the problem; that work is left to subsequent projects that usually utilize the 
findings from exploratory work.  
 
Given the objective of exploratory research being ―to case a wide net‖, the apposite 
methods are ones that accumulate a range of ideas and perspectives. Putt and Springer 
propose three techniques that are particularly apt: document review, interviews and 
brainstorming.  
 
2.2 Information Needs  
 
In evaluating programs, such as the CIF and UNFCCC funds, Murphy (1980) notes five 
distinct dimensions that researchers may examine, as listed below. While policy 
researchers may choose to concentrate on one of these dimensions, I am pursuing all 
these aspects to some degree since the aim of my thesis is to unravel the big issues 
involving adaptation finance, which will spring from all of these dimensions.  
1. Current organizational and political setting 
Understand the current organizational, political, and administrative structures of 
the UNFCCC and the CIF which manage multilateral climate change financing 
for adaptation. 
2. Essential political features 
Understand the political debates that surround adaptation finance, including the 
ones concerning UNFCCC adaptation response and the CIF.  
3. Key individuals and institutions 
Learn more about the political and economic viewpoints of key individuals and 
the structures and practices of the UNFCCC and CIF.  
4. Program‘s evolution 
Learn about the history of funding adaptation to climate change, both under the 
UNFCCC and through the CIF. 
5. Commonly accepted characteristics of successful programs  
Learn about the expectations from different stakeholders of the international 







2.3 Data Collection 
 
Figure 2.2 is a visual of the methodological and analytical approach I undertook. 
Document analysis and interviews were used to generate data and coding to analyze it. 
While the research began with document analysis, this method was used throughout to 
generate information and cross-examine it with the findings from the interviews.  
 
Figure 2.1: Method 
 
 
2.3.1 Document Analysis 
 
David Weimer and Addan Vining (2005) identify four categories of documents: ―(1) 
journal article, books and dissertations; (2) publications and reports of interest groups, 
consultants and think tanks; (3) government publications and research documents; and (4) 
the popular press‖ (Weimer and Vining, 2005, p. 311). I examined all four kinds of 
documents to develop a broad and representative understanding of climate financing, 
challenges and principles of financing adaptation, and institutional practices and 
Figure 2.1: Document analysis and interviews were conducted to garner data. Findings from and within each 
method was triangulated to extract important themes and improve the validity of the research. Coding was 
done in both a progressive and reflexive manner throughout the research so that themes were based on both 





mechanisms for climate change funds. In the case of this thesis, Categories 2, 3 and 4 
were especially of great use since not many journals and books evaluate the CIF. 
Webster and Watson (2002) provide guidance onto how to conduct structured literature 
reviews. The authors suggest that a successful literature review should be ―concept-
centric‖ (i.e. geared towards finding relevant information on concepts), which was 
adopted. Literature review was conducted in various stages, as portrayed in Figure 2.1. In 
the preliminary stages of literature review, relevant dimensions of the topic were culled 
out. The subsequent stages become progressively refined and focused on the selected 
concepts identified from the primary stages. Watson and Webster present 
recommendations on conducting the review in a structured manner. According to their 
suggestion, the literature review was commenced with a few key articles (critiques and 
commentaries on the CIF, Global Environmental Facility and climate financing from civil 
society organizations and think tank scholars), and progressed by tracing the articles 
―backwards‖ by reviewing some of the citations mentioned in the articles and ―forwards‖ 
by reviewing articles citing the current document using electronic programs such as Web 
of Science or Social Science Citation Index. 
I reviewed both primary and secondary literature. Primary literature mainly included 
documents found on the websites of UNFCCC and CIF on important decisions, financial 
modalities, governance and institutional arrangements, funding criteria etc. Secondary 
literature was mainly used to find information on the principles and characteristics of 
adaptation finance and critiques of current financial arrangements under the UNFCCC 






An application package that contained a research proposal (including information on the 
research question, research significance, hypothesis and methodology), a sample 
recruitment email, a sample recruitment telephone script, a sample consent form (to be 
signed by the interviewees to indicate their consent to participate in the research), a 
sample of interview questions, and an ethics application was submitted to the University 
of Waterloo‘s Office of Research Ethics. Upon ethics approval from the said office, I was 
able to approach people via email (first) or telephone (second, if the email response was 
not received at least within a week). The emails and telephone calls for recruitment 
strongly adhered to the format that was submitted to the ethics board; only a few 
additions were made in the introductory paragraphs to indicate why the individual was 
being approached for the interview (e.g. by mentioning some of their works that I had 
read and highlighting their expertise in the field). Although a consent form was prepared, 
each interviewee provided their consent in written over the email.  
 
Participant Selection Process 
 
Murphy assorts respondents or informants into two categories – key informants and 
regular interviewees.  Key informants are well aware of ―the program and its 





traditions‖ (Murphy, 1980, p. 78). Regular interviewees are the ones that researchers are 
more likely to encounter and who provide the bulk of information.  
 
Regular interviewees, scholars engaged in climate finance research, were selected on the 
basis of names appearing from the document analysis. Key informants were selected 
from the websites of relevant organizations (World Bank, GEF, UNFCCC, and CIF). The 
interviewees included three from think tanks scholars with expertise in climate or 
adaptation finance, one each from GEF and World Bank, and two from individuals in the 
CIF governance boards (in particular, from the PPCR Sub-committee). While the views 
expressed by the interviewees were their own and not representative of the institute 
where they worked, it was hoped that a diverse set of perspectives and understanding 




A major strength of interviews is their ability to provide information and facts quickly. 
An hour-long interview with a knowledgeable informant can generate as many important 
facts and themes as many hours of library and internet search. When timeframe of 
research is short, as in my case, conducting an interview in the initial stages of the 
research can hence be quite fruitful. As such, I conducted interviews in two phases. Phase 
I of the interviews took place in the initial stages of data collection, when document 
analysis are sufficiently (although not entirely) completed to indicate some key 
individuals to interview. Phase II took was executed towards the end of the research 
process, when the bulk of document analysis had been conducted. The first phase of the 
interview helped direct the research, whereas the second phase helped arrive at important 
conclusions about the CIF.   
 
The interviews were carried out in a semi-structured manner, starting with some general 
questions (for example, perspective on the role of World Bank in climate financing, the 
appropriate governance arrangements for administering climate finance, etc.), and 
progressing according to the responses obtained. As Dexter (1970) recommends, many of 
the questions attempted to probe for clarifications and details to solicit information that is 
not easily available through other means. Regular interviewees were asked general 
questions about the topic, like the challenges posed by climate finance and the principles 
and challenges for financing adaptation to climate change.  On the other hand, key 
informants were asked more pointed questions, for example about a particular feature of 
the CIF, or a noticeable difference between the CIF and the UNFCCC funds. Most 
interviews lasted about 30-45 minutes, and all of them were conducted over the telephone 
(in-person interviews could not be afforded because of budget constraints). Further, each 
respondent was provided with a transcript of the interview, and had the ability to review 
and change (add to or disavow) any statements they had made during the interview. 
Finally, each interviewee was also thanked (through an email letter) for their participation 
in the research.  
 
It was intended that in the first phase, only regular would be interviewed, whereas in the 





conflicts, some of the key informants (Moore Rawleston and Ari Huhtala) were 
interviewed in the first phase and some regular interviewees (Richard Klein) were 
interviewed in the second phase. Although 14 people were invited in the first phase and 
16 in the second phase, only seven people were recruited due to schedule conflicts and 
time limitations.  
 
Table 2.1: Interviewees 
  
Phase Name Informant Type Job Title Organization 






1. Project Manager, 




2.  Technical and 
Policy Advisors to the 
Philippine negotiating 
team at the UNFCCC 
1. World Resource 
Institute 
 





Neil Bird Regular 
Interviewee 
Research Fellow Overseas 
Development Institute 






Second Phase Anonymous Key Informant  1. High-level 





2. Member of PPCR 
sub-committee, 
CIF 




Division of the 
Ministry of 
Finance.  
2. Member, PPCR 
sub-committeee 
1. Government of 
Bangladesh 
2. PPCR, CIF 
Richard Klein Regular 
Interviewee 
1. Senior Research 
Fellow 
2. Adjunct Professor 
1. Stockholm 
Environment Institute 
2. Centre for Climate 
Science and Policy 









A prominent technique of analyzing qualitative data is coding. Coding entails carefully 
reading, processing and sorting obtained information into various codes. Ian Hay (2005) 
mentions three main functions or purposes of coding: to enable researcher to refine and 
condense large volumes of data; to help organize data; and most importantly to analyze 
data. During vigilant examination of the data, descriptive codes – which are the blatant or 
obvious messages and themes – and analytical codes – which describe the themes that are 
implied by the interviewees or the one that the researcher is interested in – are developed. 
Sometimes, descriptive and analytical codes are referred to as initial and interpretative 
codes, indicating their appearance in the analysis process. The next step in coding is to 
develop a coding structure in which codes are grouped into themes and concepts 
according to the linkages between them. This will further reduce the data, and illuminate 
key themes from the data. Done rigorously, the coding process can lead to new theories. 
Coding is both a recursive and a reflexive process as codes are developed and modified 
throughout the research process based on new information and emerging themes (Hay, 
2005).  
 
For analysis, initial codes were developed as soon as sufficient information was 
generated from the literature review. Codes were evaluated, modified, and added to 
throughout the research process. Finally, linkages were made between the various codes 




The initial codes helped guide the research direction, and included examination of the 
histories and structures (including governance and financial arrangements) of the 
adaptation funds in the UNFCCC and the CIF. Some of the codes developed at this stage 
were decision making rules, seat allocation in governance boards, representation of 
stakeholders (civil society participation, advisory groups, equitability, equality), power 
holdings of secretariat and management staff, processes of applying for and acquiring 
finances, allocation of funds among different climate change themes (adaptation, 
mitigation, forest, land use, etc) and developing countries. From this, the similarities and 
differences between these funds became apparent.  
 
To gain further depth into the UNFCCC and CIF funds, I read critiques and reviews that 
discussed their limitations and opportunities, and also highlighted some important 
principles and characteristics of adaptation finance. I pursued many themes emerging 
from these critiques to acquire a sense of the needs of adaptation finance. Codes at this 
stage included nature of finance (new and additional, adequate and predictable); 
provision of finance (country-ownership, leadership, and access), type of finance and 
related terms of agreement (i.e. loans, grants, equities, guarantees), special needs of 
adaptation (integrated approaches, mainstreaming). These themes were refined after the 






After the interviews were conducted, I reevaluated UNFCCC funds and the CIF with an 
eye for their response to the needs of adaptation finance and the institutional and 
governance issues relevant to raising, administering and disbursing adaptation finance. At 
this stage, most codes from the previous stages were simply refined, divided into more 
fragments (to outline different dimensions), or connected with other codes. Some of the 
newer themes that became apparent at this stage were political clashes among and 
between developed and developing countries; administration issues (institutional 
proliferation and conflicts, institutional priorities, bureaucracy and power dynamics); and 
parameters of aid effectiveness. 
 
Finally, I categorized these codes and emerging themes as part of funding, institutional 
and governance issues. Funding issues contained themes pertaining to the mobilizing and 
disbursement of climate finance. Institutional issues described the interactions between 
the CIF and the UNFCCC funds as mechanisms for climate finance. It contained themes 
that highlighted the institutional politics of climate finance. Governance issues pertained 
to the set of decision-making rules and power structures in each climate finance 
mechanism. Given the significant overlap between funding, institutional and governance 





























3.0 UNFCCC  
 
Before describing and discussing the CIF, it is useful to review the history and some 
critical components of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. The 1980s 
was a decade of rising scientific discovery and concern about anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas emissions, which culminated into the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel 
for Climate Change (IPCC) jointly by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) 
and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 1988, the same year when the 
landmark Toronto conference on ―The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global 
Security‖ was also held (Ramakrishna, 2000). In the coming years, this newly born 
scientific body released a series of reports that would shape international political attitude 
towards climate change. The first assessment report of the IPCC in 1990 declared that 
humans were responsible for climate change, and in the same year, the United Nations 
convened an International Negotiating Committee (INC) for a Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (INC/FCCC). This Committee hosted a series of five negotiation 
meetings, between February 1991 and May 1992, among global government officials 
from more than 150 countries on climate change (Ramakrishna, 2000). The topics 
covered in these meetings are surprisingly not very different from the ones still conferred 
at global climate change meetings – setting a timeline for greenhouse gas reduction and 
other targets, proposing technology transfer, defining and allocating different 
responsibilities to all countries in meeting targets. The need for a global commitment to 
meet these targets was also discussed, and consequently, in May 1992 (around fifteen 
months after the first INC convention) itself the UNFCCC Convention was born, and 
opened for signatures a month later during the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio de Janeiro. The Convention entered force on 21
st
 March 1994 with 
50 signatures. It has now been ratified by 194 countries and one regional economic 
integration organizations, and all of these signatories are called the Conference of Parties 
(COP) (UNFCCC, 2009a). The COP is the supreme body of the Convention, and 
continues to meet annually since the first COP event (COP 1) in 1995. The subsidiary 
bodies that advise the COP may and do meet more frequently to prepare for COP 
meetings. 
 
3.1 Elements of the UNFCCC 
 
The underlying objective of the Convention is to stabilize global emissions of greenhouse 
gases at a level that avoids ―dangerous anthropogenic inference with climate system‖, 
and occurs within a timeframe that permits ―ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate 
change … ensure that food production is not threatened and … enable economic 
development to proceed in a sustainable manner‖ (Article 2, UNFCCC, 1992). To guide 
their work, the UNFCCC enlists several principles (Article 3, UNFCCC, 1992): 
 
1. Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, according 
to which the developed countries must take the lead in reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions and combating impacts of climate change; 
2. Protection of vulnerable countries, in a way that ―special needs and special 





particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and of those… 
that would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the 
Convention…[are] given full consideration; 
3. Precautionary principle, by which measures must be taken ―to anticipate, prevent 
or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects‖, and 
therefore, ―lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing such measures…‖; 
4. Sustainable development, to ensure that ―policies and measures to protect the 
climate system against human-induced change …[are] appropriate for the specific 
conditions of each Party and … integrated with national development 
programmes…‖; 
5. Economic growth, so that ―Parties … cooperate to promote a supportive and open 
international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth 
and development in all Parties...‖ 
 
The Convention commits Parties to a number of things, in addition to adhering to the 
above principles. First, developed and developing country Parties are to prepare and 
submit national communications, which are essentially inventories of greenhouse gas 
emissions, both by sources and sinks (Article 4, UNFCCC, 1992). With regards to this, 
the developed country Parties must cover the ―new and additional financial resources to 
meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties in preparing their 
national communications‖ (Article 4, UNFCCC, 1992). Further, they are asked to 
formulate, implement, report and revise national (or regional) programs for mitigation 
and strategies for adaptation.  
 
The Parties must also cooperate to support technology transfer and other practices and 
processes that mitigate climate change, as well as measures for adaptation to the impacts 
of climate change. At a national level, countries are asked to integrate climatic 
considerations in their policies and actions. The developed country Parties are also asked 
to provide ―agreed full incremental costs‖ of implementing mitigation and adaptation 
measures by developing country Parties – which are agreed ―between a developing 
country Party and the international entity or entities‖ – and especially assist particularly 
vulnerable developing country Parties in meeting their ―costs of adaptation to those 
adverse effects [of climate change].‖ Developed countries should also take the lead on 
promoting, facilitating and financing access to environmentally sound technologies and 
know-how to help developing countries implement the Convention. In this regard, 
emphasis should be placed on enhancing national capacities and technologies, and other 
organizations that are better equipped to do so may assist (Article 4, UNFCCC, 1992).  
 
In addition the developed country Parties are obliged to undertake additional measures. 
These Parties are listed as members of Annex II, and compromise of the OECD countries. 
Along with Annex II members, the Annex I constitutes of ―economies in transition‖ 
(mostly states in Central and Eastern Europe)
4
. The latter group must adopt national 
                                               
4 Annex II is a subset of Annex I and consists of only developed (OECD) countries, where as the Annex I 





policies and undertake corresponding action to enhance greenhouse gas sinks and 
reservoirs (such as forests and oceans). These Parties must communicate details of these 
policies, measures and the resulting emission reductions within six months of enforcing 
Convention, and periodically thereafter. These Parties must individually or collectively 
aim to reduce their emissions to the 1990 levels (Article 4, UNFCCC, 1992).  
 
3.2 Negotiations and Important Decisions 
 
Kyoto Protocol and the Adaptation Fund 
 
The 1997 COP meeting, COP-3, concluded with the Kyoto Protocol, a legally-binding 
instrument that committed industrialized countries to reduce their emissions of four 
greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur hexafluoride) and two 
groups of gases (hydrofluorocarbons and perfluorocarbons) by 5.2% against a 1990 
baseline year during 2008-2012. These emissions do not include ones from international 
aviation and shipping, and are in addition to the industrial gases regulated under the 
1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The Kyoto Protocol 
was opened for signatures on March 16, 1998, and by 2004, it had achieved commitments 
by enough Annex I Parties to fulfill the stipulation that 55% of the total emissions of 
Annex I Parties had to be covered by the Protocol for it to be endorsed.  
 
In order to fulfill their commitments in a cost-effective way, a clever scheme has been 
invented that permits Annex I Parties to trade emissions in a carbon market. Each of these 
countries has agreed to targets for limiting or reducing emissions, which are measured as 
Assigned Amount Units (AAUs). A clever, three-tier market scheme allows countries to 
trade and ultimately limit or reduce emissions, as well as support sustainable 
development in developing countries. Under the Emissions Trading mechanism, 
countries that have exceeded their targets (i.e. reduced more emissions than they are 
committed to by the Kyoto Protocol) can sell these spare units to countries which are 
below their emission reduction targets. In addition to reducing national emissions, Annex 
I countries can also implement mitigation project in both developed and developing 
countries; and the incentive for doing so, among other things, is ability to earn tangible 
credits for reducing emissions. Along with earning AAUs by limiting or lowering 
emissions in their own countries, Annex I Parties can gain and trade Emission Reduction 
Units (resulting from the emissions reduced in another Annex I country) or Certified 
Emission Reductions (resulting from emissions reduced in a non-Annex I country). The 
latter mechanism, of implementing mitigation projects in developing countries to meet 
emission reduction targets of developed countries, is called the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). The carbon market is a thriving USD 30 billion dollar industry (as of 
2006) and still growing (UNFCCC, n.d.c).  
 
A levy on the proceeds from CDM projects have been used to fund adaptation in 
developing country, albeit only a 2% levy is now directed for this cause.  
                                                                                                                                            
greenhouse emissions, only the Annex II Parties are asked to provide financial and technological resources 





The Adaptation Fund (AF), established at the Kyoto Protocol, receives the proceeds from 
this 2% levy on global carbon transactions. It also obtains some investment income and 
money left over from its administrative budget (which is supported through voluntary 
contributions from individual donor countries). The budget at the end of July, 2010 for 
Adaptation Fund Board amounted to USD 160 million, and it is estimated that by the end 
of 2012, the total resources would equal USD 350 million (UNFCCC, 2010). In the AF, 
too, the World Bank has a role to play – that of a trustee. The secretariat role is assigned 
to the Global Environmental Facility. The operating entity of the Adaptation Fund is the 
Adaptation Fund Board which manages and supervises the Adaptation Fund, in 
accordance with the guidelines received from those COP members who ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol (CMP). The AFB is composed of 16 members and 16 alternate members, who 
are elected at CMP sessions. These members are composed of two representatives of each 
of the five UN regional groups, one representative of the Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS), one representative of the least developed country Parties, two other 
representatives of Annex I Parties, and two other representatives of non-Annex I Parties 
(Adaptation Fund, 2009). 
 
In addition to a very balanced governance structure (geographically, economically, and 
vulnerability-wise), there are several features of the AF which make it particularly 
attractive to the developing countries (Harmeling & Klog, 2010). One, it permits the 
recipient countries to pick their desired implementing entities (either national or 
multilateral) for applying for resources in the Adaptation Fund. National and multilateral 
implementing entities (NIE or MIE, respectively) must, however, receive accreditation 
from the Board, which verifies the agencies‘ compliance with the Board‘s fiduciary 
standards (Brown, Bird & Schalatek 2010b). Two, the set-up of project cycle is such that 
it consciously attempts to preclude any bureaucratic delays, with a two stream procedure 
for small (less than USD 1 million) and regular projects (more than USD 1 million). 
Third, all funds are disbursed as grants, without any unreasonable (economic or political) 
conditionalities. Fourth, the AF resources are completely separate from Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), since they are mainly derived from 2% of the Certified 
Emission Reductions (CER) issued from CDM projects.  Finally, all projects and 
programs are required to be fully endorsed by the recipient country government 
(Harmeling & Klog, 2010).  
 
Despite these achievements, there is still room for improvement. Scholars and 
commentators have indicated the low success rate of NIEs in receiving accreditation from 
the Board, which is impeding progress towards providing direct access to resources 
(Brown, Bird & Schalatek 2010b & Alpha & Harmeling, 2011). In response, the AF has 
refused to set apart resources for improving the capacities of national institutes, and 
instead, has requested multilateral organizations to provide assistance in this regard. 
Despite chances of competition, multilateral organizations (UNDP, UNEP, World Bank) 
have agreed to assist national institutes; however, it still remains to be seen whether the 
multilateral institutes will actually do so in practice (Brown et.al, 2010b). Another 
problem with the Adaptation Fund is the lack of transparent reporting on project 





information on how decisions are made can help countries improve their project 
proposals (Alpha & Harmeling, 2011). 
 




 session, the COP produced the Bali Road Map, which charted-out the course of 
future negotiations, and developed a two-track approach. Discussions were to be carried 
out in two parallel paths - the Kyoto Protocol and the Convention streams (although it 
was recognized that there were considerable overlaps between the topics covered in these 
two streams, this division was made for effectiveness). As part of this, the COP launched 
the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) and the Ad  
Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto 
Protocol (AWG-KP), which were due to complete their assigned work and present it in 
COP-15 in Copenhagen (UNDP, 2008). The Bali Action Plan reiterated the need for new 
and additional resources, including concessional and official funding for climate change 
(UNFCCC, 2007). Further, the Plan asserted for these resources to be provided in an 
adequate, predictable and sustainable manner (UNFCCC, 2007).   
 
Copenhagen and Cancun 
 
Because of various unresolved issues, the AWG-LCA was not able to conclude its work 
at Copenhagen. In terms of long-term financing, the only outcome was a commitment 
(but not a legally-binding one) from the developed country Parties to provide USD 30 
billion between 2010-2012 period and rising to USD 100 billion by 2020. In addition, the 
Convention recognized the necessity to keep temperature rise below 2
o
C, but did not 
assign individual commitments to Annex I countries. The Copenhagen Accord was not 
formally endorsed by the COP, but only taken note of (UNFCCC, n.d.d).  
 
At Cancun, the AWG-LCA submitted the outcome of its work – the Cancun Agreements 
– which also included a decision to further enhance its lifespan for one more year to 
complete its work for the 17
th
 COP session. Also, at this COP session, the Cancun 
Adaptation Framework (CAF) was launched with the objective of ―enhancing action on 
adaptation‖ (UNFCCC, 2011). The work outlined under the CAF would be assisted by an 
Adaptation Committee Progress. Further progress was made by agreeing to build a Green 
Climate Fund as the new financial mechanism of the Convention. The envisioned Green 
Climate Fund would be headed by a board of 24 members and would channel a 
―significant share of new multilateral funding for adaptation‖. Arrangements are for equal 
seats among developed and developing countries (the latter group will be composed of 
―relevant United Nations regional groupings‖ and Small Island Developing States and the 
Least Developed Countries). In addition to the Board, a transitional committee, 
compromising of 40 members (25 from developed countries) and a standing committee 
will be formed. The transitional committee is tasked with making recommendations to 
the COP at the seventeenth session on the various aspects of the Green Climate Fund, 
including various governance issues (rules and procedures of the Board and other related 
governing bodies); legal and institutional arrangements and methods of administering 





independent evaluation of the fund, performance evaluation, and ensuring financial 
accountability. The standing committee will be placed under the COP and assist it in 
carrying out its functions in relationship to its financial mechanism (such as providing 
specific and more frequent guidance and stricter oversight than before). The roles and 
functions of the standing committee are not yet defined (UNFCCC, 2011).  
 
3.3 Institutional Arrangements 
 








The COP is the supreme body of the Convention. To assign different commitments to its 
members, the COP distinguishes between Annex I, Annex II and Non-Annex I Parties, as 
discussed earlier. There are other groupings of COP members for negotiation purposes, 







Annex II Some Economies in 
Transition, including 
Russian Federation, the 
Baltic States, and 





* Several Other Groupings of countries exist, and become particularly important during UNFCCC negotiations: 
• Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) is an alliance of some 43 low-lying and small island countries that are particularly vulnerable to sea-level rise. 
Most of these countries are also members of the G-77. 
• Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) comprises Mexico, the Republic of Korea and Switzerland.  
• European Union (EU) is a union of 27 European states. As a regional economic integration organization, the EU is a Party to the Convention; however, can 
not exercise any separate vote from its members   
• Least Developed Countries (LDC) consists of 50 countries which demonstrate low economic growth levels and have particularly high vulnerability to the 
impacts of climate change 
• Umbrella Group: Consists of non-European developed countries, including Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian 






















The UNFCCC secretariat is located in Bonn, Germany. It is institutionally linked to the 
UNFCCC and is administered under the United Nations rules and regulations. It is 
accountable to the COP, the members of the COP who have ratified the Kyoto Protocol 
(the CMP), and subsidiary bodies. The head of the secretariat, the Executive Secretariat is 
appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in consultation with the COP 
through its Bureau. Some of the main duties of this body are making necessary 
arrangements for the sessions of the COP and its subsidiary bodies; monitoring the 
implementation of the Convention by analyzing and reviewing information provided by 
the Parties, as per their commitments; assisting Parties in implementing their 
commitments; providing substantive analysis, as required for negotiations; maintaining 
registry for the issuance of emissions credits and assigned amount of emissions for Kyoto 
Protocol; coordinating with secretariats of relevant climate institutes, like the GEF and 
the IPCC; drafting official documents; preparing official documents for the COP and its 




At the launch of the Convention, only two advisory groups were created – the Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), which informs the COP of 
timely scientific and technological matters relating to the Convention, and the Subsidiary 
Body for Implementation (SBI), which assists in the assessment and review of COP‘s 
implementation. The Convention, however, makes provisions for additional bodies to be 
created as deemed necessary during the life of the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, n.d.b).  
 
The Financial Mechanism 
 
After much political dispute between the developed and the developing countries, the 
Global Environmental Facility (GEF) was made an interim financial mechanism of the 
UNFCCC in 1994. In two years, the institute‘s status was raised as the financial 
mechanism of the UNFCCC ―on an on-going basis, subject to review every four years‖ 
(UNFCCC, 2011). The legal relationship of the GEF and the Convention is laid in the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), as agreed during COP 2 (Decision 12/CP.2). 
The COP provides regular guidance to the GEF on policies, programs priorities, and 
eligibility criteria for funding, and the GEF reports annually to the COP (UNFCCC, 
2011). This annual report provides details on all GEF-financed activities executed for the 
purpose of implementing the Convention, including ones conducted by GEF‘s 
implementing agencies, secretariat or other executing agencies implementing GEF-
financed projects. Furthermore, to strengthen its accountability to the COP and its 
legitimacy as the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, the MOU stipulates that GEF‘s 
annual reports should indicate how the Facility has applied the guidance and decisions of 
the COP in its Convention-related works. This report should cover projects approved or 
under implementation by the GEF Council and describe the financial resources required 
for their support. Finally, the GEF Council should appraise its monitoring and evaluation 
activities for the projects in the climate change focal area (Global Environmental Facility 






GEF‘s governing bodies compromise of an Assembly, an Executive council, a 
functionally-independent Secretariat, implementing entities and an advisory group 
(Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel). The Assembly compromises of all GEF 
participants and meets once every three years to review general policies and operations of 
the Facility. The main governing body is the Executive Council, which is composed of 
fourteen from developed countries, two from Central and Eastern European countries, 
and sixteen from developing countries. Each member has one vote, and decision are 
mainly based on consensus; although, in cases when consensus is not possible, decision 
are made on the basis of 60 percentage majority of donation-weighted votes and 60% 
majority of member votes (GEF, 2004).  
 
The World Bank serves as the Secretariat, and is ―functionally-independent‖. After much 
contention between developed and developing countries on designating the World Bank 
with the secretariat role, the Bank was appointed as a functionally-independent 
Secretariat of the GEF (GEF, 2004). As a secretariat, the Bank reports to the assembly 
and the Council, and implements the decisions made by these two bodies. It also 
coordinates with the secretariat of the UNFCCC.  
 
The World Bank also serves in other capacities. Alongside, UNDP and UNEP, it is the 
main implementing agency for GEF funds for climate change focal area. These three 
organizations have reached an agreement amongst each other on how to coordinate in 
carrying out the operations of GEF. In addition, other agencies can be involved in 
operational activities through the implementing agencies (Boisson de Chazournes, 1999).  
 
3.4 Funds for Adaptation 
 
The foremost fund established by the Convention was the GEF Trust Fund; however, 
most resources from this fund were allocated for mitigation efforts (Huq & Burton, 
2003). Nevertheless, the rising importance of adaptation, along with the realization that 
certain vulnerable developing countries require financial and technical assistance to adapt 
to climate change led to the development of three additional funds during the seventh 
COP (COP 7) held in Marrakech, Morocco: The Least Developed Countries Fund 
(LDCF), the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), and the Adaptation Fund. Of these 
three funds, the LDCF and the Adaptation Fund are solely devoted to adaptation (Desai, 
2003). The LDCF supports 49 Least Developed Countries (LDC) in preparing and 
implementing National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPA), which identify priorities 
for adaptation activities for a given LDC). So-far, 44 countries have already developed 
their NAPA, and two projects are endorsed. Administratively, the LDCF operates 
separately from the GEF trust funds, and includes new elements like, emphasizing the 
link between adaptation and development, provisions for expediting projects cycle, no 
requirements for demonstrating global environmental benefits or utilizing the Resource 
Allocation Framework or applying the incremental costs, provisions for funding 
additional costs of adaptation, and options for hunting for co-financing opportunities 
(National Adaptation Program of Action [NAPA], n.d.). Co-financing opportunities are 






The Adaptation Fund operates from a 2% levy on the proceeds of Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). Finally, the SCCF support a range of agendas in addition to 
adaptation – technology transfer, transport, industry, forestry and waste management 
(Desai, 2003).  
 
Despite these new financial instruments, critics argue that adaptation is still sidelined 
when it comes to funding. In 2004, the GEF had allotted a majority of its total USD 1.8 
billion grant money to mitigation projects. By contrast, all funds for adaptation that are 
managed by GEF, including the Strategic Priority for Adaptation component of the GEF 
Trust Fund, LDCF, and the SCCF tally to more than USD 320 million. Of this, GEF has 
only disbursed USD 110 million since 2005 (Climate Funds Update, 2011). Furthermore, 
most of the GEF funds have only been disbursed to a handful of developing countries – a 
study pointed out that 63% of global climate change funding has been received by twenty 
countries; 52% by 10 countries; and 25% by India and China (Mace, 2005).  
 
Figure 3.2: Adaptation Funds administered by GEF 
 
 
The limited reach of climate change funds is partially due to the emphasis that GEF 
places on funding projects that yield global environmental benefits (which gives an 
advantage to large developing countries like India and China), and partially due to the 
institutional capabilities of some developing countries in successfully dealing with the 
GEF bureaucracy (Mace, 2005). Another frustration that some developing countries 
express in procuring GEF Funds is the convoluted and slow preparation, approval and 
disbursement procedures of the GEF (Greene, 2004). Delays also occur in calculating the 
incremental costs of a project, which is what the developed country Parties, and therefore 
the GEF, are required to fund under the UNFCCC. Finally, the biggest criticism of the 
GEF is the inadequacy of funds, especially when compared to the expectations of 
developing countries after the Earth Summit and the financial needs of adaptation 
(Greene, 2004).  
 
Developing countries, and recently the IEA and OECD have criticized the GEF for a lack 
of an effective mechanism for counting contributions from developed countries (Roberts, 












Reporting System‘s Rio Markers is a self reporting system, in which each donor uses its 
individual method to determine whether climate change is a ‗principal‘ objective (i.e. the 
prime reason for funding the activity is climate change), or ‗significant‘ objective (the 
activity has been formulated or adjusted to help meet climate change objectives (Brown 
et.al. 2010a).  
  
3.5 Monitoring and Evaluation under the GEF 
 
After consultations with an international accounting firm and implementing and 
executing agencies, GEF developed a set of minimum fiduciary standards that institutes 
implementing or executing its activities must meet. These are rigorous standards and 
present a comprehensive definition of fiduciary standard, as well as pay attention to the 
issues of institutional integrity and governance (Balllesteros et.al, 2010a).  
 
The GEF also employs mechanisms to ensure that implementing entities meet required 
fiduciary and environmental standards and to monitor its activities. Beginning with the 
fourth replenishment period of the GEF, in 2007, the GEF Council developed a Results 
Based Management framework (RBM) for monitoring and reporting on its activities. The 
RBM will report at three levels – institutional, programmatic and project-level. As part of 
the RBM, expected outcomes and indicators are developed to keep a track of clear results 



























4.0 Climate Investment Funds 
 
Separately administered from the GEF or another UNFCCC-appointed institute, the 
Climate Investment Funds were introduced in the 2008 by the World Bank. They are part 
of the Bank‘s overall strategy on climate change and development. Although these funds 
are not an alternate to the larger multilateral negotiation and financing process under the 
UNFCCC, they can have substantial impact on financing for adaptation to climate 
change, especially given the size. As mentioned, some critiques have been quick to point 
out that the CIF will ―undermine global climate action‖ (Tan, 2008). However, a closer 
look at some of the features of the CIF, including its overall structure, principles and 
objectives, governance arrangements, financial modalities, and other salient features can 
help decide what sort of impact are the CIF likely to have on global climate finance for 
adaptation. This Chapter will describe some of these features of the CIF. After a brief 
history of the CIF, this Chapter will outline the overall CIF structure. After this, 
descriptions of the CIF‘s two twin funds - Clean Technology Fund (the larger of the CIF 
funds) and the Strategic Climate Fund (a multi-purpose fund) will follow. Finally, the 
sole adaptation component of the CIF, the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience will be 
described. 
 
4.1 A Brief History 
 
The Climate Investment Funds sit at the interface of the World Bank‘s energy and 
climate change strategies. The funds, therefore, reflect the evolving agendas of the World 
Bank with respect to both these streams. In the 1990‘s, with expectations of rising 
investments in energy from the private sector, the World Bank curtailed its funding for 
energy. However, in 1997, there was a significant drop in the aggregate financing 
available for energy as the private sector investment had peaked and the World Bank 
energy program had been depressed (World Bank Group [WBG], 2009). Hence, there 
was a renewed demand for greater resources in energy (Development Committee, 2006). 
Subsequently, the World Bank hiked and revised its energy portfolio, paying greater 
attention to the environment and sustainable development (WBG, 2009). In 1999, the 
International Financial Cooperation released its energy strategy paper, entitled ―Fuel for 
Thought: Environmental Strategy for the Energy Sector‖, which heavily emphasized the 
need to safeguard environmental interests in the energy sector, and laid out six strategic 
objectives by which certain environmental issues, including climate change, could be 
addressed within the energy sector (International Financial Cooperation, 1999).   
 
Like the World Bank, and perhaps due to a new-found global focus on climate change, 
many international institutes and forums began to integrate climate change considerations 
in their regular affairs. The G-8 summit in Gleneagles in July 2005 marked a particularly 
important event for global action on climate change. The leaders of the largest economies 
voiced concerns over the linked issues of climate change, rising energy demand and the 
challenges of sustainable development. In the Gleneagles Plan of Action, officials from 
the G-8 countries assigned the World Bank a ―leadership role‖ in creating a framework 





development banks were invited to enhance investments and undertake measures to 
promote energy efficiency, renewable energy and low carbon growth in their activities.  
 
Shortly thereafter, in April 2006, the World Bank prepared the Clean Energy and 
Development: Towards and Investment Framework (CEIF) for the meeting of the 
Development Committee (Development Committee, 2006). In aiming to achieve a double 
dividend, of scaling up energy access in developing countries to spur growth, while also 
reducing environmental footprint, the CEIF outlined a two-track approach of activities to 
be completed by September 2006, and those to be completed over the next two years 
since the launch of CEIF, which included evaluating the impacts of climate change 
(Development Committee, 2006). A particular study by International Development 
Association (IDA), depicted the urgent need for adaptation in IDA supported countries 
(i.e. one of the world‘s poorest and most vulnerable communities) and highlighted the 
potential role for IDA in building resilience to climate change in these countries 
(International Development Association (IDA), 2007). The conclusions from this report 
were presented in the following Development Committee meeting, where the Board 
Members asked the World Bank to prepare a strategic framework to consolidate the 
Bank‘s approach in promoting low-carbon growth, poverty reduction and climate change 
adaptation in developing countries (International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) & World Bank, 2008). At the same time, the Committee also 
requested the Bank to build greater cooperation with other development partners and 
harness additional resources for climate change from both pubic and private sectors 
(October 2007). In time for the next Development Committee meet in 2008, the Bank 
released its Strategic Framework for Climate Change and Development (SFCCD) that 
stands on six pillars (IBRD & World Bank, 2008):  
 
1. Support climate actions in country-led development processes; 
2. Mobilize additional concessional and innovative finance; 
3. Facilitate the development of market-based financing mechanisms; 
4. Leverage private sector resources;  
5. Support accelerated development and deployment of new technologies; and 
6. Step-up policy research, knowledge, and capacity building. 
 
The Framework was finalized after a global consultation process, involving many 
countries, civil society organizations, and meetings in 76 countries. In general, there was 
a ―broad‖ support for World Bank Group‘s
5
 involvement in climate change. The 
stakeholders agreed that the Bank must adopt a development perspective to tackle this 
issue and underscore the importance of adaptation and climate risk management. 
Furthermore, the need to mobilize significant climate finance that is additional to the 
general development assistance (ODA) was recognized (IBRD & World Bank, 2008). 
                                               
5 The World Bank Group consists of five institutes, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, International Development Association, International Financing Corporation, the 





Finally, stakeholders asked the Bank to uphold and comply with the UNFCCC principles, 
and value equitable and sustainable growth
6
 (IBRD & World Bank, 2008). 
 
The Framework outlines key initiatives that the World Bank Group can embark on in 
response to development challenges posed by climate change, including: 
1. Scaling-up new and additional finance for adaptation; 
2. Screening its general operations for identifying climate risks and opportunities; 
3. Supporting the development of carbon markets; 
4. Developing lessons for climate risk management; 
5. Coordinating different financial instruments, both from within and outside of the 
Bank, to optimize their effectiveness;  
6. Equipping their clients with better knowledge and capacity of dealing with 
climate change;  
7. Collaborating with other development partners to improve the monitoring of 
climate finance and its additionality.  
8. And promoting global dialogue on climate change through annual release of the 
World Development Report on Climate Change;  
 
Finally, the Framework sets specific targets and also makes some provisions for 
monitoring its progress. In particular, the Framework aims to increase financing for 
renewable energy and energy efficiency by an average of 30 percent a year from a 
baseline of 600 million in average annual commitment in the FY 2005-2007; boost 
investments in low carbon projects from 40% in FY 2006-2007 to 50% in 2011; and 
enhance support for sustainable forest management to capture any mitigation potential in 
that sector (IBRD & World Bank, 2008). 
 
In line with the aims of the CEIF and the SFCCD, the Climate Investment Funds (CIF) 
were first proposed in February 2008 as a collaborative effort among multilateral 
development banks to scale-up investments in low-carbon and climate-resilient 
development. The CIF were envisioned as a pair of multi-donor trust funds, each with a 
separate focus and governance arrangement. Careful to not undermine the UNFCCC 
track, the CIF were introduced only as an interim mechanism that would retire once a 
post-2012 financial architecture was developed by the UNFCCC. On July 1
st
, 2008, the 
World Bank Board of Directors finally gave the green signal to the CIF. They are housed 
and administered by the World Bank. 
 
4.2 The CIF Structure 
 
The two sister funds are the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) and the Strategic Climate 
Fund (SCF), and their design is cemented in the following principles, which are to be 
                                               
6 While these have been described as the general outcomes of the consultation process, a closer look at the 
feedbacks reveals the frustration of some developing country officials and civil society representatives with 
the design of the framework and the negotiation process (example comments from Sheila Page (Overseas 






upheld by all the MDBs (Climate Investment Funds (CIF), 2008c & Climate Investment 
Funds (CIF), 2008d): 
 
1. Promote sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction and mainstream 
climate change objectives into sustainable development; 
2. Improve access of client countries to adequate financial resources and appropriate 
technologies for climate action; 
3. Mobilize new and additional finance for climate change adaptation and 
mitigation; 
4. Ensure that programs are designed using a country-led approach and integrated 
into country-owned development strategies, in accordance with the Paris 
Declaration; 
5. Recognize that the UNFCCC is the ―appropriate body for broad policy setting on 
climate change‖, and exercise caution so as to not ―preempt‖ the results of 
UNFCCC negotiations and to abide by the principles of the UNFCCC; 
6. Build knowledge, capacity and experience of client countries with respect to 
actions on climate change; 
7. Build partnerships amongst MDBs and other institutions and stakeholders, 
including the private sector. With respect to this, the MDBs must stay accountable 
to their own governing structure; 
8. Identify complementarities between the activities of the CIF and those of the GEF 
and the UN to build synergies and avoid overlaps; 
9. Provide transparency and openness in governance and financing operations; 
10. Be aware that sustainable outcomes depend on sustaining the total wealth, 
including produced, human, institutional and natural. 
 
Governance and Institutional Arrangements 
 
There are five elements of the CIF layout – Trust Fund Committee, MDB Committee, 
Administrative Unit, Trustee, and the Partnership Forum. The Trust Fund Committee is 
the central authority of each of the CIF funds. Amongst other things, the Committee 
holds the responsibility of:  
1. Approving criteria and guidelines for selecting programs and setting priorities; 
2. Approving allocation of Trust Fund resources for programs and projects, as well 
as for administrative purposes; 
3. Ensuring broad compliance of CIF strategies with the UNFCCC principles; 
4. Providing guidance on convening the Partnership forum, and ensuring that lessons 
learned from the CIF experience are shared with the UNFCCC; 
5. Ensuring the monitoring and periodic independent evaluation of the MDBs, vis-à-
vis their performance and financial accountability; 
 
Decision-Making in the Trust Fund Committee 
 
The Trust Fund Committees have representations from five main bodies – contributor 
countries, recipient countries, MDBs, World Bank, and a country for which an 





decision-making members. The CIF divide votes equally among the recipient and 
contributing countries, so that each group has matching number of members and votes. 
The contributing countries are those that pledge at least an agreed minimal amount to the 
Trust Fund, and thereby enter into a Contribution Agreement with the trustee (CIF, 2008a 
& CIF, 2008b). The minimal amount is set through consultations amongst the 
contributing members. The eligibility criterion for recipient countries has two parameters: 
countries must be ODA eligible according to the OECD/DAC guidelines and have an 
active MDB country program (or be in the process of negotiating one with a MDB) (CIF, 
2008c & CIF, 2008d).  
 
Representatives of the donor countries and recipient countries are selected through a 
consultation process amongst these set of countries. However, countries are advised to 
consider regional balance, equity (diversity of opinions), and efficiency and effectiveness 
of the decision-making process while selecting representatives to sit on the Trust Fund 
Committee. Moreover, recipient countries are also prompted to reflect on the technical 
and policy expertise of their representatives. Over the years, selecting members for the 
Trust Fund Committee has become more complicated as the number of interested donors 
and recipients are growing. As such, countries are advised to elect representatives from 
groups of countries for membership on the Trust Fund Committee (CIF, 2008a & CIF, 
2008b).  
 
Decision on the Trust Fund Committee is made by consensus among these two groups, 
and in case consensus is not reached, then the proposed decision is either postponed or 




The Trust Fund Committee also has participation of active observers which include 
representatives from civil society organizations, UN, and the private sector. Observers are 
appointed to the Trust Fund Board through a self-selection process (that is coordinated by 
the World Business Council on Sustainable Development for private sector and by 
Resolve for the non profit civil societies). As active participants, observers can request 
agenda items for the Trust Fund Committee meetings and recommend experts to speak on 
a particular issue (Guidelines for inviting). They may also exercise the liberty to make 
verbal interventions during the proceedings of the Trust Fund Committee. While most 
Trust Fund meetings are open to observers, some ―executive sessions‖, where discussions 
on investment plans for client countries are conducted and finalized, are not. The civil 
society participants have expressed their disappointment with the exclusiveness of 
executive sessions and asserted that these meetings can benefit from the vast technical 
expertise and experience of the civil societies. Lately, therefore, the Trust Fund 
Committee has permitted observer to participate and provide feedbacks during MDB 
presentations of the investment plans. Nevertheless the executive session doors are shut 








The Partnership Forum is an annual congregation of all stakeholders involved in the CIF 
process. It serves as a knowledge sharing platform, where the stakeholders share their 
experiences with CIF and discuss CIF‘s impacts, results and strategic direction. In 
addition, the donor and eligible recipient countries hold meetings to shuffle members in 
the Trust Fund Committee. The last Partnership Forum was held in October 2010 (CIF, 
2008a & CIF, 2008b).  
 
While the CTF and SCF have their separate Trust Fund Committee, they both share a 
common MDB committee, Trustee and Administrative Unit (CIF, 2008a & CIF, 2008b).  
 
Because the CIF aim to coordinate climate financing activities amongst MDBs and 
collectively polish their skills and capabilities in mobilizing climate finance at a large 
scale, the MDB committee has a pivotal role to play. In particular, they are in charge of 
coordinating activities and sharing information and knowledge among the MDBs. They 
also serve to enhance the leveraging potential of the CIF funds by hosting annual 
consultations with various development partners, including bilateral agencies to identify 
co-financing opportunities. Finally, they monitor the implementation of CIF programs 
and report their compliance with the criteria established by the appropriate Trust Fund 
Committee (CIF, 2008a & CIF, 2008b).  
 
The Administrative Unit, which sits in the World Bank office in Washington D.C., is the 
main labor force for the CIF. They have a number of responsibilities, including providing 
research support and making recommendations to the Trust Fund Committee on the scope 
and objectives of CIF and parameters of program criteria and priorities; preparing annual 
reports on the progress of the CIF; setting agendas for meetings; maintaining 
comprehensive databases; and facilitating the transmission of information and 
knowledge. The Administration Unit consults with all stakeholders, including the MDB 
committee and the Trust Fund committee, while conducting its operations (CIF, 2008a & 
CIF, 2008b).  
 
The Trustee, as any other, is responsible for receiving, holding and transferring resources 
for various activities, as per the demand of Trust Fund Committee. The Trustee is directly 
accountable to the Trust Fund Committee with regards to its operations. In relation to 
this, it is obliged to provide regular reports to the Trust Fund Committee on the financial 
status of the trust funds. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
which is a component of the World Bank Group, serves as the trustee of all CIF Trust 
Funds (CIF, 2008a & CIF, 2008b).  
 
4.3 Clean Technology Fund 
 
CTF aims to promote low carbon growth in developing countries by catalyzing the 
diffusion, deployment and transfer of low carbon technologies; leveraging nationally-
owned clean and low carbon development plans so that they are economically feasible; 
and supporting large-scale programs and projects that are ―transformational‖ in nature. 
With a budget of over four billion dollars, the CTF invests in a range of activities at the 





concessional financing (grants and concessional loans) and risk mitigation instruments 
(guarantees and equities) for its activities. Resources provided by the CTF become 
available to the country through the MDB. A number of factors are taken into account 
when allocating these resources, including the comparative advantage of the MDB and 
experience in the region/country, country requests, and the quality of the proposal. When 
evaluating proposals and prioritizing among projects and programs, the CTF Trust Fund 
Committee considers five factors (CIF, 2009b):  
 
1. GHG reduction potential – in relation to this, the commercial and technological 
feasibility of the project is also assessed. The highest priority is attributed to 
technologies which are commercially available and promise huge mitigation 
potential; 
2. Cost-effectiveness – calculations for cost effectiveness include variables to 
account for reduction in GHG emissions and the technological cost over time due 
to scale and learning effects; 
3. Demonstration potential at scale – Projects that demonstrate significant emission 
reduction potential when replicated and which can stimulate strategic changes in 
the targeted sector, sub-sector or market are prioritized;  
4. Development impact – Programs and projects will be assessed, in accordance with 
the  standard MDB appraisal criteria, in terms of their potential for achieving 
environmental co-benefits, accelerating access to modern energy or transport 
services, and reducing energy intensity of the GDP; 
5. Implementation potential – Projects with a good co-financing potential from 
domestic (both public and private), bilateral and multilateral sources will be 
prioritized. Moreover, proposals that are accompanied with enabling policy and 
institutional environment, which can over time sustain and manage the program 
independently are preferred.   
6. Additional cost and risk premium – Grants will be provided to cover additional 
cost or risk premium to make an investment viable, and each proposal should 
adequately identify these factors. 
 
In order to procure funding from the CTF, an interested country proceeds with a ―joint 
mission‖ – or a discussion on how CTF resources can be employed to finance low carbon 
activities in the country – with a MDB and other development partners. The country then 
leads, with the assistance of a MDB, in the development of an investment plan that 
outlines how the CTF resources can be used to implement low carbon activities in a 
country through a joint MDB program. Investment plans are co-owned by the country 
and the MDB. After their submission and approval by the CTF Trust Fund Committee, 
each program springing from the investment plan must also be submitted to the 
Committee for approval on allocation of CTF resources. However, any further processing 
of the program, including monitoring its progress, are consistent with the normal MDB 





committee on the progress of any projects funded by CIF resources, the MDBs perform 
these evaluations using their regular procedures
7
 (CIF, 2008a & CIF, 2008b). 
 
The governance and organizational structure of the CTF is based on the equality 
principles established in the design documents of the CIF. There are eight donor country 
members and eight eligible recipient country members, which are the voting members. 
The Trust Fund committee also compromises of a representative from the MDB and the 
World Bank, and a country for which an investment plan is being discussed. Finally, the 
Trust Fund Committee is co-chaired by one recipient and one donor country members, 
who are elected by the Committee to serve for six months (CIF, 2008b).  
  
4.4 Strategic Climate Fund 
 
The SCF provides funding for a range of specific focal areas of climate change activities.  
With the same overall objectives as the CTF, the SCF has identified the following three 
programs to channel its resources (CIF, 2008d): 
1. Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR): Being the first program established 
under the SCF, this pilot initiative seeks to integrate climate resilience 
considerations into national development strategies and plans. 
2. Forest Investment Program (FIP): This program aims to promote sustainable 
forest management by providing funds to curtail deforestation and forest 
degradation. 
3. Scaling-up Renewable Energy in Low Income Countries Program (SREP): This 
program supports development of ―energy-efficient, renewable energy, and access 
to moderns sustainable energy‖ in low income countries. 
    
In addition to these, other programs can be established under the SCF with the permission 
of the SCF Trust Fund Committee, which has developed the following checklist for 
program approval: 
 
1. multiple donor interest in establishing a SCF Program;  
2. broad applicability of lessons to be learned;  
3. sufficient resources to finance activities at scale;   
4. complementary to any other multilateral financial mechanism or initiative;  
5. and link between climate change and development. 
 
The SCF governance arrangement is reflective of the general CIF format, with eight 
members each from donors and eligible recipient countries as part of the decision-making 
segment, and one representative each from the World Bank and the MDBs as part of the 
non decision-making segment. Distinctly, though, each of the three SCF programs have 
their own governance body, consisting of six donor country representative, of which one 
                                               
7
 However, after three years of operation of the CIF, a joint evaluation will be conducted 
by independent evaluation departments of the MDBs. These evaluations will take into 






belongs to the SCF Trust Fund Committee; six recipient country representative, of which 
one belongs to the SCF Trust Fund Committee; and other members as deemed 
appropriate by the SCF Trust Fund Committee.  
 
Uniquely, the PPCR also reserves a seat for a developing country chair or vice-chair of 
the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB), or another member of the AFB nominated by the 
chair or vice-chair on its Trust Fund Committee. This is to ensure that there is a better 
coordination of global efforts towards climate change adaptation, and that developing 
country concerns are strongly represented on the board (CIF, 2009c). Each of these sub-
committee members serves for only one year, as opposed to two, and it is ensured that the 
there are no duplicate representation of the same country. The responsibilities of the sub-
committee resemble that of the Trust Fund Committee, and include among others, 
sanctioning criteria for selecting and prioritizing programs, operations and financing 
modalities; approving financing for individual programs and projects; harmonizing 
activities with those of other development partners; and authorizing regular reports for 
SCF Trust Fund Committee (CIF, 2008a).  
 
Members of the MDB Committee and the Trustee may attend the SCF Trust Fund  
Committee as observers (CIF, 2008a).  Furthermore, any recipient countries that are not 
members any of the Trust Fund Sub-Committees can attend these as observers. To ensure 
good linkages with key partners and promote the efficient use of global resources, the 
PPCR Sub-Committee also invites representatives of GEF, United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the 
UNFCCC as observers.  Finally, representatives of SCF advisory groups (Expert Group) 
and partnering civil societies can also observe the PPCR Sub-Committee meetings. 
 
4.5 Pilot Program for Climate Resilience 
 
The PPCR supports initiatives that integrate climate resilience into national development 
strategies, while building on and complimenting previous national and international work 
in this area, like NAPAs and activities of the UN and other development agencies. Given 
this general objective, the PPCR endorses two categories of activities: first, of building 
technical assistance to advance or complement existing national work to integrate climate 
resilience in national or sectoral development plans; and second, of supporting adaptation 
programs which have already been identified in national or sectoral plans by providing 
additional financial resources for both public and private sector investments (CIF, 
2009c).  
 
An expert committee is delegated with the task to recommend countries to select for 
PPCR funds. The Expert Group consists of at most eight members that are selected by the 
PPCR Sub-Committee, and with expertise in a range of fields, including policy, 
development, science and environment and governance/institutional studies. This Group 
is recommended by the PPCR Sub-Committee to evaluate countries along eight related 






1. Country Vulnerability: Vulnerability is to be assessed on the basis of the strength 
to particular climate impact; the country‘s exposure and sensitivity (determined as 
a function of the GDP‘s dependence on the impact) and adaptive capacity 
(measured using governance indicators and the Human Development Index)  to 
the impact; the existence of any special needs of the country, in accordance with 
relevant conventions (particularly the UNFCCC) and international processes (like 
the IPCC); 
2. Country Eligibility: Three categories of eligibility are to be used as follows – 
ODA eligibility in accordance to the OECD/DAC guidelines; presence of an 
active MDB program (physical presence of a MDB or a regular dialog with one);  
3. Country Preparedness: The following possibilities should be considered - a 
country may rapidly permit adaptation-development planning that yield rapid 
results and replicable experiences and lessons for the international community and 
ensure demand-driven support to national PPCR partners; the country already 
receives external funding for adaptation and has absorptive capacity for more 
external funding;  and the PPCR can support national adaptation programs, plans, 
and policies for building demand-driven adaptive capacity;  
4. Country Distribution: The country should be regionally representative and in 
addition to the geographic spread, dimensions of governance, vulnerability and 
development stage can also be taken into account; 
5. Hazard types: The pilot countries must represent a diversity of climate related 
hazards, and individual countries should be accordingly picked; 
6. Coherence and Value Addition: PPCR funded activities should be complementary 
to those of other adaptation funds, and must add to the evolving national, regional 
or global activities. Therefore, synergies between different adaptation-related 
activities (like disaster reduction) should be explored and attempt to embed these 
in national country programs should be made;   
7. Replicability and Sustainability: The possibility of imparting lessons learnt and 
experiences widely, both during and beyond the PPCR lifetime;  
8. Scalability and Development Impact: Extent to which PPCR can provide 
sufficient resources to place national development planning on a more climate-
resilient track.   
 
After pilot countries are selected by the PPCR-SC, further operations are conducted in 
two phases. In Phase I, a series of cross-sectoral dialog are initiated to arrive at a common 
vision for a strategic approach to climate resilience. Phase I is concluded with a 
development of the Strategic Program for Climate Resilience (SPCR), which sketches an 
investment program for the each pilot country (or region) that is in line with the agreed 
national vision on a climate resilient path. The pilot plan is then relayed to the PPCR-SC 
for approval, and when this is granted, the country and the associated MDB can embark 
on Phase II of PPCR.  Phase II is characterized by developing and implementing specific 
strategic programs from the SPCR. The PPCR strategic programs should be inclusive 
activities that involve various development partners in the country. Therefore, from the 
onset of Phase, special emphasis is laid on consulting with all relevant stakeholders, 
including relevant government agencies, NGOs, scholars and civil society members, 





bilateral and multilateral development agencies). Because the MDBs are responsible for 
implementing strategic programs from the PPCR in the pilot countries, alongside their 
other activities in their country portfolio, their participation in Phase I of the PPCR is 
especially crucial. The PPCR recommends that to ensure adequate roles of the MDBs in 
Phase I, the pilot countries can assign their chosen MDB with an equal partnership role in 
the development of the program or a lead administrative role for the PPCR funds. 
Furthermore, the SPRC should lay out the roles of the MDBs and include a confirmed 
agreement with other development partners on cooperation and co-financing of activities. 
Regardless of their role in Phase I, the MDBs are entrusted with preparation and 
implementation of all investment programs in Phase II, according to regular MDB 
procedures (CIF, 2009c).  
 
With the PPCR, an emphasis is being laid on programmatic approaches. As examples of 
the kinds of actions that can be supported by the PPCR, Programming and Financing 
Modality documents, presents knowledge-building activities among key policy makers 
and stakeholders; institutional strengthening and policy revisions to mainstream climate 
resilience into development; support for R&D activities to improve the monitoring of and 
adaptation to various climate hazards; provision of concessional financing to private 
sector to encourage or enable them to invest in climate-sensitive sectors, with respect to 
adaptation (CIF, 2009d).  
 
On the topic finance, the PPCR will provide grants, concessional loans and guarantees for 
supporting its activities. It will also exploit co-financing opportunities by identifying 
common goals and cooperating with other national, bilateral and multilateral 
development partners and the private sector. However, grants are set aside for preparing 
the Strategic Program for Climate Resilience, project preparation and for covering 
additional costs to make an investment climate resilient. It must be noted that the 
countries can choose to access only grants from the PPCR, and that the grants will be 
disbursed on more concessional terms than IDA loans (CIF, 2009d).  
 
A key feature of the PPCR resources is their ability to blend with MDB loans (and funds 
from other interested development partners) to create larger volumes of resources 
available for activities and to augment the concessional factor of these loans. 
Furthermore, PPCR funds seek to encourage private sector investments in climate 
resilient national development. While the PPCR financing documents makes a strong 
case for concessional loans, only one pilot country is eligible for borrowing on standard 
MDB terms. Others have the option of accessing credit through other windows or country 
strategy assistance. Depending on their risk ratings (the PPCR-SC recommends following 
the same practice as in IDA and the relevant Regional Development Banks), countries 
will be eligible for either a blend of loans and grants or pure grants. Through the 
proposed terms, public sector projects procure 75% in concessional loans, which mature 
in 40 years with a grace period of 10 years with interest rates of 2% during FY 11 – FY 
20 and 4% during FY 20 – 40 (CIF, 2009d).  
 
Finally, PPCR monies, in the shape of grants, concessional loans, guarantees and risk 





climate resilient development. Private sector projects that may not be financially feasible 
at the moment, however, have potential to be replicated and raise revenue without the 
support of subsidies will be supported. In this sense, these investments will take care as to 
not substitute or displace conventional commercial financing for private sector projects, 
but tap into newer and presently unviable projects. 
 
4.6 Monitoring and Evaluation in the CIF 
 
The CIF only employ multilateral development banks for implementing their projects, 
which have good fiduciary standards. However, there are no formal requirements of a set 
of standards (fiduciary, environmental and social) that are to be met to become an 
implementing entity for the CIF. Nonetheless, MDBs are required to report annually to 
either the CTF or the MDB committees. The MDBs can use their own monitoring and 
evaluation procedures for this purpose. To generate lessons and be transparent to the 
larger global community, an independent evaluation of all the SCF Trust Fund operations 
and their impacts will be conducted jointly by the independent evaluation departments of 
the MDBs after three years of operations. Results achieved and impacts made will be 
published and widely available.  
 
Both the CTF and the PPCR have made some provisions for monitoring the impacts of 
their programs and projects. The CTF Committee has proposed a draft framework that 
will assess programs on a number of parameters including deployment of low-GHG 
emissions technologies on a significant scale; impact on carbon intensity; measurement 
of GHG reductions against an estimated baseline; and percentage of investment leveraged 
from other public and private sources. The CTF also seeks to monitor individual 
portfolios of projects through indicators like the development outcomes of projects, the 
aggregate emission reductions, the quality of project supervision, or delays in 
implementation. In addition, the World Bank has also offered to monitor macro-
economic indicators for a country, namely average carbon intensity of the sector or 
country, the share of low-GHG emissions technologies in production, or the average 
efficiency of coal- and gas-fired plants (CIF, 2008c & CIF, 2009d).  
 
As opposed to the CTF, the PPCR has already composed its results framework with 
consultations from a group of independent experts.  PPCR‘s Performance Measurement 
Framework (PMF) is designed by the PPCR Sub-Committee in consultation with 
interested governments, the MDBs and other development partners. The results 
framework assesses PPCR projects in their ability to pilot or demonstrate approaches to 
integrate climate risks in national development strategies; strengthen national capacities 
to integrate risks into development strategies; enhance and build on ongoing initiatives to 
raise investments into adaptation programs; and promote knowledge sharing at country, 
regional and global levels. Each MDB uses the PMF for its annual reporting to the Sub-
Committee. This helps standardize reporting and facilitates in drawing lessons from the 
PPCR experience for the development community. Lessons and experience from these 






Despite these provisions for monitoring and evaluation, there is still no mechanism under 
the CIF for accounting for new and additional funds (additional to ODA) from donor 
countries. Developed countries are able to count and report their contributions as climate 









































5.0 Needs of Adaptation  
 
To assess the CIF as a channel for adaptation finance, it is important to review some of 
the fundamental needs of adaptation finance. There has been significant development in 
the understanding of how adaptation financing should occur – i.e. what principles must it 
adhere and what practices should it adopt. It will be useful to delve into this literature, so 
that CIF can be examined in their ability to cater to the needs of adaptation finance. This 
chapter will also reveal certain areas in which some of the UNFCCC funds are weak and 
strong as providers of adaptation support. Hence, knowledge about the needs of 
adaptation finance will also facilitate the comparison between UNFCCC adaptation funds 
and the CIF. 
 
After a brief introduction into the evolution of adaptation finance and the estimates of 
adaptation cost, the rest of the chapter will discuss various needs of adaptation finance. 
This portion will be discussed in three sections, covering the mobilization, management 
and disbursement of adaptation finance.  
 
5.1 Evolution of Adaptation Finance 
 
The treatment of adaptation as a strategic response to climate change has evolved 
significantly since the first congregation of the Conference of Parties in 1995. Climate 
change at the time was viewed as medium to long term issue that would manifest itself in 
about 50 to 100 years (Huq & Reid, 2004). Therefore, the focus from the start had been 
on curtailing the concentration of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the atmosphere. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that the UNFCCC‘s objective is centered around mitigation, 
not adaptation. It was only in theory, and due to much insistence from the least developed 
countries and the small island developing states, that adaptation found a place in the 
UNFCCC negotiations, especially with regards to the responsibility of developing 
countries to support adaptation actions in the South. However, there was confusion over 
how adaptation funds could be used, since there was very little knowledge about the 
vulnerability of developing countries and the needs of adaptation. These concerns were 
addressed at the first COP meeting in Berlin in 1995, when Decision 11/CP.1 was 
adopted to initiate a series of studies on climate change adaptation over a vaguely set 
time period. Three stages of adaptation were defined, of which the first was the ―short 
term‖ and the last two were ―medium to long term‖ (UNFCCC, 1995). It is noteworthy in 
these descriptions, however vague they sound, that early negotiators did not view 
adaptation as an immediate concern, and so much of the work outlined in the first two 
stages is of preparatory nature – i.e. one that enhances knowledge about climate change 
impacts and adaptation measures, instead of taking concrete adaptation actions. 
Moreover, even though financial provisions were made in this first COP gathering to 
support vulnerability and adaptation assessment in National Communications (Huq & 
Reid, 2004), most countries provided more information on mitigation vs. adaptations in 
the said reports.  
 
The slow approach of the international community towards adaptation is not entirely due 





the lack of scientific know-how about adaptation. In fact, climate change is a good 
example of science informing policy, and vice versa. It was not until the IPCC Third 
Assessment Report (TAR) in 2001 that the scientific and political bodies, alike, began to 
grasp the urgency of adaptation actions. TAR was instrumental in highlighting that 
impacts of climate change are already evident, and that even if Kyoto Protocol was 
successfully implemented, the emission reductions achieved would only be a drop in the 
bucket. In other words, TAR reinforced the inevitability of adaptation, and called it a 
―necessary strategy at all scales to complement climate change mitigation efforts‖ 
(McCarthy et.al, 2001). With growing scientific basis for adaptation, the subsequent COP 
events paid far greater attention to adaptation issues. 
 
Of particular importance is the seventh annual gathering of the Conference of Parties 
(COP 7) in 2001 in Marrakech, Morocco, which immediately succeeded the release of 
TAR. The outcome of this meeting was the Marrakech Accords – a set of decisions 
endorsed by the COP. The Parties agreed on establishing a number of financial 
mechanisms and a range of other activities for adaptation.  
 
However, most of the resources were not going into concrete actions for adaptation; but 
instead on generating information about adaptation. With a severe shortage of funds for 
adaptation, developing countries were advocating a more action-oriented approach that 
would entail implementation of adaptation activities, and generating lessons from pilot 
exercises (Kartha, Bhandari, Schaik, Cornland, & Kjellen, 2006). 
 
Over the years, with greater knowledge on adaptation, the inherent relationship between 
adaptation and development has been illuminated. The idea that adaptation activities must 
be integrated into the larger development agenda became popular in policy circles in 
2006 (Klein, 2008). Consequently, several international forums developed proposals and 
adopted plans to better integrate adaptation into development, like the OECD‘s 
Declaration on Integrating Climate Change Adaptation into Development adopted jointly 
by the development and environmental ministers (Organization for Economic 
Development [OECD], 2006b). Reflecting on this changed perspective about adaptation, 
leading development banks also took measures to better integrate adaptation into their 
activities. The World Bank, for example, made commitments to devise risk management 
strategies to screen and mitigate climate risks on its investments (Development 
Committee, 2006). 
 
5.2 Needs of Adaptation Finance 
 
In this section, the needs of adaptation finance will be discussed, in particular the 
principles in which adaptation finance should be grounded and the structural and 
financial needs of adaptation activities. After a brief comment on the cost of adaptation 
finance, the needs of adaptation finance will be discussed in three sections – mobilizing, 









5.3 Adaptation Cost Estimates 
 
A number of estimates for adaptation costs exist; a few of these are summarized in Table 
I. It can be gauged from the differences among these figures and from the vast range 
within each estimate that large uncertainties are present in the calculations. The 
ambiguities in the numbers are due to some limitations and assumptions employed in the 
methodologies. For the UNFCCC estimates, scholars have pointed out that the 
calculations do not envelop all the relevant sectors (mostly constrained to coasts), and 
even for the sectors included, not all important factors are covered. Some scholars have 
also argued that these numbers are arrived at by partially extrapolating values from 
developed country studies, hence they may not properly reflect conditions in developing 
countries. The IPCC also concluded in the Fourth Assessment Report that the current 
estimates on costs and benefits of adaptation are quite poor and generally exclude equity 
considerations, in terms of the distributions of costs and benefits (Parry et.al, 2007).  
 
Klein and others quote a recent OECD that supported this view, arguing that most 
literature on costs make strong assumptions and operate with crude relationships between 
variables; and many studies assume climate change to result in temperature change and 
sea-level rise alone, while ignoring the possibility of abrupt change in mean climatic 
conditions and the frequency and intensity of extreme events (Klein et.al, 2008). Finally, 
the OECD study also points out that almost no attention is devoted cross-sector analysis 
to examine cumulative effects of adaptation, and there is very little work on macro-
economic consequences of the impacts of adaptation.  
 
Some assessments of the literature on adaptation costs have inferred that the apparent 
deviation and disagreement among different estimates are due to underlying interests of 
the research organizations. Klein. et.al (2008) have bolstered their claim by presenting 
that World Bank estimates are lower and different from those of the African Group, G 77 
and Oxfam. Moreover, whereas the World Bank, which purportedly represents donor 
shareholders, makes a case for larger private sector participation, the latter groups, which 
represent the views of recipient countries, envision most contributions being derived from 
public sources. In any case, the weakness of adaptation cost estimates has suppressed the 
political will to augment adaptation activities. Still, the insufficient funding for adaptation 
is the bigger culprit in withholding politicians from setting ambitious targets for 
adaptation (Klein, 2008).         















Figure 5.1: Estimates of Annual Additional Costs of Adapting to Climate Change 
 
Research Organization Cost Estimates (billions of 
USD) (per year) 
Time Frame 
 
UNFCCC 60 – 182 (overall) 
28 – 67   (in developing       
countries)  
2030 
UNDP 86 – 109 2010 – 2015 
World Bank 9 – 41  2010 – 2015  





5.4 Mobilizing Adaptation Finance 
 
This section deals with issues that are relevant to raising resources for adaptation. 
 
New and Additional 
 
One distinguishing feature between conventional foreign aid and funding for climate 
change, a characteristic that is strongly underscored by developing countries and southern 
NGOs, is that climate finance is not charity, but an entitlement. Some have gone as far as 
denoting climate finance as ―climate debt‖ that developed countries must pay to 
developing countries (Wilks, 2010). The argument is that developed countries have 
essentially reduced the ―atmospheric space‖ for economic growth in developing countries 
and resulted in various impacts to which these countries must adapt. By this reasoning, 
the developing countries also rightly demand that climate finance must be additional to 
the exiting development assistance, i.e Official Development Assistance (ODA).  
 
Conceding to these demands, the COP in 2007 launched the Bali Action Plan to chart out 
a process for a renewed climate change treaty. The Plan asserted that climate change 
finance must be ―new and additional resources, including official and concessionary 
funding for developing country Parties‖ (UNFCCC, 2007). In addition, southern 
governments and NGOs have asked for the funds to be in the shape of grants, not loans. 
Since then, developed countries have continued to make claims and commitments of 
providing new and additional resources (the latest one being the pledge made in 
Copenhagen of USD 30 billion for a three year period in 2010-2012, that is to be ramped 
up to USD 100 billion per year by 2020). At the same time, many developing countries 
and civil society leaders have accused the donors of falling short of their commitments
8
. 
The tension between the two blocks is fueled by an absence of an agreed definition (by 
all Conference of Parties) for new and additional. 
 
                                               
8 A WRI study that tracks fast-start finance has found that many contributions were drawn from ODA 
(Ballesteros, 2010b) 
Figure 5.1: Although there is a big range in these numbers, they nevertheless highlight that 





Nevertheless, there are many possible definitions of additionality (Stadelmann, 2010 & 
Brown, Bird, & Schalatek, 2010a).  Stadelmann and Brown and her colleagues lists eight 
options for defining a baseline, each with its own advantages and disadvantages, and 
points to the inevitability of a compromise between developed and developing countries 
for achieving a universally acceptable definition. Huq and Burton (2003) assert that this 
move would be necessary for rebuilding trust after the failure of talks in Copenhagen. 
Brown and her colleagues (2010a) consider similar options for defining additionality, 
arguing that a common definition will ensure that adequate funding is channeled towards 
climate change, while also avoiding diversion from development assistance. They also 
outline the different implications of these definitions on the measurement, reporting, flow 
and computation of climate finance; nonetheless, these definitions provide enough liberty 
to donor countries to individually determine the most suitable approach to raise additional 
climate finance (Brown et.al, 2010a).  
 
Simultaneously while defining additionality, concerns about the diversion of ODA for 
climate finance must be addressed. It has been pointed that with two exceptions - the 
Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund and the German International Climate initiative  (an 
initiative of the German government to support mitigation and adaptation activities in 
developing countries),both of which derive resources from auctioning emission 
allowances in the carbon market, - all other financing instruments are also diverting 
resources from ODA (Oxfam, 2009). This calls for the need to explicitly delineate the 
relationship between ODA and funding mandated by the climate change convention. 
Oxfam affirms that three principles are vital for assuring additionality: binding annual 
commitments from the donors, a compliance mechanism with penalty provisions to 
ascertain whether donors have delivered pledged resources, and a revision of ODA DAC 
rules so that ODA is easily distinguished from climate finance (Oxfam, 2009).  
 
Adequacy and Predictability 
 
Adequacy and predictability are important parameters of climate financing, which have 
been cemented in the UNFCCC. These characteristics are not only vital for the success of 
the Convention, but also for the trust between and among Annex I, Annex II and non-
Annex I Parties. Unfortunately, so-far financing for climate change has neither been 
adequate nor predictable, except for Adaptation Fund of UNFCCC‘s Kyoto Protocol and 
the German International Climate initiative. Regardless of the uncertainty of the costs and 
benefits of climate change adaptation, the collective resources inarguably fall grossly 
short. Even if the lowest figure of adaptation cost estimates, 9 billion per year (by World 
Bank) is used for comparison, the collective multilateral adaptation finance amounts to 
only USD 1.6 billion only
9
. This very vague approximation, nevertheless, illuminates the 
intensity of the challenge lying ahead of climate finance. Moreover, to allow for strategic 
adaptation planning and sustainable adaptation activities in developing countries, 
resources must also be predictable. As of yet, the bulk of climate resources are not 
predictable (except the two abovementioned carbon mechanisms) because they are 
mainly replenished through voluntary contributions from donor countries (Muller, 2008).  
 
                                               





Sources of Finance 
 
Because climate change is a public concern, and especially because adaptation has many 
development co-benefits, it is justified to use international public resources for climate 
change. However, relying solely on public resources, which are already strained and 
earmarked for other purposes, will neither generate adequate nor predictable funds 
(Baudenville, 2009). Moreover, encumbering the public sector alone with this climate 
challenge, may significantly lower funding for development work (Baudenville, 2009). 
Therefore, mobilizing resources for climate change will require a combination of public, 
private sources, market mechanisms and other innovative schemes. This was concluded 
from the Report by High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing, which was 
specially commissioned by the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, shortly after the 
conclusion of the COP 15 in Copenhagen to provide recommendations on mobilizing 
new and additional resources for climate change. In particular, the AGF categorized four 
kinds of sources for climate finance: ―public sources for grants (including taxation and 
auctioning of emission allowances, removal of fossil fuel subsidies, other new taxes such 
as a financial transaction tax and general public revenues through direct budget 
contributions), development bank type instruments, carbon market finance and private 
capital‖.  Lately, interest have emerged in creating a financial mechanism by controlling 
emissions from the aviation and shipping industries, which are not formally not 
monitored by the Kyoto Protocol (IMERS, 2011). 
 
With regards to public and private sources, striking the right balance between the two is 
heavily contested in climate finance literature and also failed to reach consensus within 
AGF (Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing (AGF), 2010). The AGF reports 
that while some of its experts argued for a prime role of the public sector, others claimed 
that the private sector would be more appropriate in taking the lead, as it already plays a 
key role in many climate-sensitive sectors by financing large-scale technology 
deployment and supporting entrepreneurship, and is able to provide predictable and 
scalable finance (AGF, 2010). Regardless, the report has strongly emphasized the role of 
both public and private sectors (AGF, 2010).  
 
A related issue is the portion of grants and loans that should be used for climate finance. 
Providing grants alone would be consistent with the ―polluter-pays‖ principle that many 
believe should guide the mobilization of resources for climate change. However, as some 
indicate that given budgetary constraints of developed countries, delivering on this 
principle may prove difficult (Baudenville, 2009). To raise adequate resources for climate 
change, a combination of grants and loans may be necessary. Baudenville supports this 
argument, indicating that grants can be used to leverage substantially greater volumes of 
funds through concessional loans. Moreover, she asserts pure grants may be more 
suitable for technical assistance and capacity building, however, other financial 
instruments like ―concessional loans, equity participation, and partial-risk guarantees 
with similar grant-equivalent value‖ may be more apt for targeting specific market 






In addition, newer sources will become instrumental in raising money for climate change. 
The AGF report and other sources (Baudenville, 2009, Hallegatte, 2008, & Ballesteros 
et.al, 2010a) have specially drawn attention to public carbon market revenues, including 
international and national auctioning of emission allowances; revenues from international 
aviation and maritime transports; and taxation on financial transactions. Some scholars 
have asserted that these sources, which appear to be less like aid money, are likely to be 
more predictable and additional to ODA than bilateral or multilateral funding (Hallegatte, 
2008). Indeed, there is a need for more studies on the right use and combination of 
various financial instruments and sources for the climate change (Baudenville, 2009).  
 
Lately, interest has been seen in emission reductions from the international maritime 
transport. Currently this industry only accounts for 3% of the total emissions from fossil 
fuel; however, this number can rise to 15% by 2050, if no action is taken to curtail 
emissions. Emissions from maritime are more than double that of air transport, and are 
not currently covered by the Kyoto Protocol (International Maritime Emission Reduction 
Scheme [IMERS], 2011). Simultaneously, while creating newer opportunities for 
financing, proposals for creating market-based mechanisms to generate funds for climate 
change are being put on the table (International Union for Conservation of Nature 
[IUCN], 2010).  
 
Counting Contributions  
 
Part of the reason that it has been difficult to ensure that ODA resources are separated 
from climate aid is due to shortcomings of the method by which contributions are 
counted. Currently the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reports on all ODA flows. Since 
1998, the OECD DAC monitors aid for accomplishing the objectives of Rio Conventions, 
including climate change. The OECD DAC applies Creditor Reporting System (CRS) 
and Rio Markers, according to which an activity is considered as climate change-related 
if ―it contributes to the objective of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate.‖ The system is a self-reporting one, in which each donor uses its individual 
method to determine whether climate change is a ‗principal‘ objective (i.e. the prime 
reason for funding the activity is climate change), or ‗significant‘ objective (the activity 
has been formulated or adjusted to help meet climate change objectives). There are a 
number of limitations with this method. First, the definition of climate change-related 
activities is limited and fails to qualify adaptation as a response to climate change. 
Second, only bilateral aid is monitored through this system, therefore this system will not 
be able to track aid provided by multilateral development banks or other multilateral 
agencies. Third, OECD DAC only tracks aid for sector-wide activities or projects, not for 
programmatic budgetary support (which may become more prominent in future, 
especially for adaptation). Fourth, because there is a possibility that each donor can come 
up with different interpretations of ―climate-related‖, it would become difficult to 
compare contributions from different donors. Finally, donors may be inclined to classify 
their contributions as climate aid, if they are under pressure to meet their obligations of 






5.5 Administering Adaptation Finance 




Over the years, there has been an explosion in climate financing institutes, with old 
mechanisms renovating or simply re-labeling old practices to make their case for a 
greater role in channeling climate funds. One estimate suggests that a new financial 
mechanism for climate change springs once every six months (Wilks, 2010). Institutes 
perceive climate change as a new ―gold rush‖, and hope to gain from the vast volumes of 
finance that will flow for climate change (Wilks, 2010). However, the plurality of climate 
finance institutes has rightly raised many eyebrows. Worries of whether this proliferation 
of funds and mechanisms will ineffectively duplicate rather than compliment each others‘ 
activities, impede any real progress on climate finance and squander scarce resources are 
circling the minds of many linked to the climate financing issues.  These are also some of 
the concerns that arose with the introduction of CIF as yet another institute for climate 
change.  
 
Eurodad, a network of 58 European Development NGOs, recommends that a government 
must indicate two funds that must be closed down whenever it propose a new fund 
(Wilks, 2010).  A move towards a more consolidated climate finance regime will require 
merging or cessation of some funds. With a revision of the mitigation targets due in 2012, 
and some expected changes to UNFCCC financing regime, the question of institutional 
interplay will be raised. Whether the UNFCCC‘s revised financial mechanism becomes 
an umbrella mechanism for all the existing funds, or completely replaces all the previous 
funds, it is time to ponder on what sensible institutional and governance practices and 
principles can be adopted for a new climate change regime. Furthermore, lessons drawn 
from the evolving understanding of climate finance can help in evaluating the strengths 




In light of the rapid emergence of climate finance institutes, a couple of relevant matters 
have been noted. Clearly, many of the existing institutes have comparative advantages in 
certain areas of climate finance – for example, institutions can function as centers of 
negotiations, regulations, actions and information (Michonski & Levi, 2010). This is not 
to say, however, that these institutes must do so at the expense of their main focus and 
objectives, which may be poverty reduction or food security (Michonski & Levi, 2010). 
However, existing institutes must be reformed, especially with regard to their ongoing 
support of carbon-intensive growth models and their traditional governance practice (that 
skews power towards the wealthier countries), to mainstream climate change 
considerations in their overall work program and redistribute power more equally 






An extensive WRI study on the legitimacy of climate finance institutions, ―Power, 
Responsibility and Accountability‖ draws a number of characteristics that climate 
financing institutes must carry to appear ―legitimate‖. The paper argues that whether new 
institutes are borne or older ones prevail, a new landscape of climate finance mechanism 
must adhere to a set of principles and demonstrate a number of capacities that qualify it 
as a legitimate institute for climate finance (Ballesteros et.al, 2010a). Some of these 




The Convention asks for power to be shared equitably amongst all Parties to the 
Convention (Article 11.2). The Convention is not explicit as to what this means, 
however, scholars have argued for a balanced representation of all stakeholders in the 
governance boards. Action Aid provides with a more specific definition: ―Action Aid 
regards an equitable representation of all Parties as an actual majority of developing 
countries, reflecting the composition of the UNFCCC and guaranteeing the participation 
of those most impacted by climate change.‖ (Action Aid, 2009a). Action Aid emphasizes 
that the participation of affected communities in the decision making process, particularly 
for adaptation funding, is a must. The Organization adds that this can be achieved 
through participation of leaders or institutes accountable to vulnerable populations in the 
decision-making structures (Action Aid, 2009a).  
 
Over the years, the governance boards of climate finance institutes have become more 
balanced in terms of allocating seats between developed and developing countries 
(Ballesteros et.al, 2010a). Greater representation of recipient countries on the governing 
boards of international financial institutes can enhance recipient country ownership 
(which is the ability and responsibility of the “developing countries [to] set their own 
strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption” in the 
Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action (OECD, n.d.), and thereby 
effectiveness of climate finance. 
 
However, equality in the share of seats and votes alone does not translate into equality in 
the share of power. Ballesteros et.al (2010a) point out that power is not only exercised 
formally via the governance structure of the institute, but also through its operational 
procedures. In addition, they note that while the formal share of power between the 
developed and developing countries is leveling out (with equal votes and representation 
between the two blocs in the governing boards), the balance is still tipped towards the 
developed countries when its comes to informal power dynamics. Contributing countries 
are able to maintain a stronghold on climate finance institutions because they continue to 
make contributions on a voluntary basis, in contrast to the polluter-pays principle 
enshrined in the Convention. This permits donors to stick conditionalities – specifically, 
ones that reflect only donor priorities and are not meant as social and environmental 
safeguards – that may impede progress towards ambitious adaptation targets. 
Conditionalities allow donors to cast influence over the entire length of an institute‘s 





or allocated to individual projects – and may thus be seen as unfair by developing country 
partners.  
 
Formal power granted in climate finance institutes (such as the GEF) is further diluted 
when certain functions are outsourced to other institutes, which are traditionally loyal to 
developed countries. Because of the complexity of programs and projects, certain 
functions (such as implementing, monitoring, proposing projects) are designated to other 
institutes (like the MDBs). While this may be in obedience to the principle of institutional 
economics, and therefore, may be an effective use of scarce resources, it also permits 
these institutes to apply their own governance standards on the use of resources for 
climate change.     
 
To exert more control over the use of climate finance, developing countries have begun 
bidding for an elevated involvement of national entities. However, for accessing this 
control, national institutes will have to demonstrate good environmental safeguards, high 
fiduciary standards, capacity to manage and use large-scale, anti-corruption measures, 
grievances mechanisms and inspection procedures of climate finance (Ballesteros et.al, 
2010a & Brown, Bird, & Schalatek, 2010b). 
 
Transparency and Accountability 
 
Article 11 of the UNFCCC also demands that its financial mechanism function in a 
transparent manner. Ballesteros and her colleagues argue that to appear legitimate, 
institutes must be accountable to donor and recipient governments and the intended 
beneficiaries of the adaptation funds (2010a). In other words, institutes must be able to 
demonstrate their achievements to all the relevant bodies. This is usually done at two 
levels – first, institutes must be able to demonstrate that they have the necessary fiduciary 
standards and environmental and social safeguards in place to administer climate funds, 
and two, institutes must report on whether/how they are supporting the objectives of the 
fund. For the first case, multilateral institutes are required to meet certain approved 
standards. Implementing entities for the GEF-administered adaptation funds and the 
Adaptation Fund must meet certain standard criteria (only MDBs serve as implementing 
entities for the PPCR, and are not required to receive any accreditation or approval from 
the trust fund committees).  
 
For demonstrating their ability to yield outcomes, institutes generally adopt a results-
based approach, which is also recommended (Ballesteros et.al, 2010a). However, for 
adaptation, developing a results framework can be especially challenging, since there are 
usually multiple objectives and goals that are difficult to measure numerically. Even then, 
various adaptation funds have developed results frameworks. As was discussed in the 
earlier chapters, both the PPCR and the GEF-administered funds for adaptation have 








The debate over balancing national and international institutes will remain. Traditional 
development agencies have pleased contributors by measuring and managing the impacts 
of their investments; unfortunately, this has at times diverted attention from national 
concerns and created a bureaucratic jumble in developing countries (Ballesteros et.al, 
2010a). With improvements in the capacities of national institutes to manage climate 
finance and mechanisms to internationally evaluate and accredit national entities, a 
greater degree of trust between the contributor and recipient countries can be gained. In 
addition to being transparent and accountable to international community (through 
international bodies like the COP), national entities must also be so to their own citizens. 
In fact, national stakeholders, including civil societies, independent research institutions, 
and the private sector should be closely involved in the process of developing national 
and local proposals and investments for climate change. Participation of these 
stakeholders in project preparation will also increase the chances of its success (Action 
Aid, 2009b). Moreover, strong accountability measures and environmental and social 
safeguards should be implemented, including ―sound fiduciary management, 
anticorruption measures, and grievance mechanisms and inspection procedures‖ 
(Ballesteros et.al, 2010a). Finally, a greater convergence of national and international 
interests is required, so that national programs contribute positively to the global 
environment and protect the most vulnerable countries and communities.  
 
Climate finance institutes can also gain lessons from the failings and successes of current 
institutes. In particular, lessons can be drawn from the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund 
(KPAF). While it is uncertain that given its small size, the KPAF will become a central 
financing entity, its successful financial arrangements should be adapted, like equitable 
representation in its governing board, provision of innovative and predictable finance, 
and direct access to resources. However, these arrangements must not simply be 
facsimiled. Studies indicate, for example, that despite the ability of accessing funds 
directly through their national entities, many countries delegate the task to multilateral 
institutes. One of explanation for this is that there is a conflict between Adaptation Fund 
Board‘s fund disbursement on the basis of first-come first-serve and the current lack of 
capacity of some national institutes (Brown et.al, 2010b). There are signs that many 
developing countries are opting to apply for, and access resources through the same 
multilateral institutes which have received accreditation from the Adaptation Fund with 
relative ease (Brown et.al, 2010b). It may be useful, both for the successes of direct 
access through Adaptation Fund and for adaptation financing in the long-run, for other 
financial mechanisms, like the CIF and the LDCF, to help build capacities of national 
implementing entities.    
 
Knowledge Sharing  
 
An important institutional need in climate finance is generating and sharing knowledge 
and coordinating efforts of various institutes. A number of knowledge gaps remain in the 
climate finance regime, such as the need to assess the viability of various financial 
instruments for climate financing; research on the suitability of particular financial 
instruments (such as loans, grants and equities) to particular climate action (mitigation or 





institutions involved in climate financing, so that their work can be more complementary 
than duplicative. Addressing these needs will not only have the intended benefits of 
improving global institutional knowledge on climate change and avoiding repetition of 
past mistakes (thereby enhancing the effective use of climate finance). It may also lead to 
consolidation and standardization of institutional rules and formalities regarding climate 
change, which may lower costs and simplify bureaucratic procedures. (Action Aid, 2009) 
 
Lessons from the Global Environmental Facility 
 
The institutional bickering over climate finance precedes even the birth of the UNFCCC. 
GEF was conceived in 1989, following a number of crucial events which elevated 
concerns over global environment and highlighted the necessity of collective global 
actions, namely the publication of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development report, ―Our Common Future‖ in 1987, the signing of the Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of Ozone Layer in 1985, and its Montreal Protocol on 
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer in 1987 (Streck, 2001).  The newly-formed 
mood for global environmental protection permeated through the walls of many 
international forums. At a joint ministerial meeting of the World Bank Group and the 
International Monetary Fund in Bangkok 1989, the French government proposed the 
Global Environmental Facility that would provide dedicated financial support for global 
environmental programs (Ervine, 2007). As a supportive gesture for their proposal, the 
French committed USD100 million over a three year period. The task of developing 
specific modalities of the Facility was delegated to the World Bank, which presented a 
blueprint of the GEF in November 1990 (Streck, 2001).  
 
Not surprisingly, the World Bank developed a proposal that would be administered by the 
World Bank and contain a voting structure that resembled the conventional contributions-
based World Bank practice. Furthermore, the UNEP, UNDP and the World Bank were 
authorized as the implementing entities (Streck, 2001). Anxious that developing countries 
may propose an alternative fund in the upcoming Earth Summit in 1992, sixteen OECD 
countries alongside nine developing countries officially endorsed the GEF and pledged 
USD 860 million to preempt negotiations on this topic during the conference (Ervine, 
2007). In November 1991, GEF was launched as a three-year, USD 1 billion pilot 
mechanism to co-finance projects with global environmental benefits in developing 
countries and countries in transitions in four focal areas – global warming, biodiversity, 
international waters and ozone depletion (Ervine, 2007). The institutional architecture for 
climate change, therefore, began as a very exclusive, donor-driven process. However 
upsetting this sounds, this was also the normal course of international development aid at 
the time – most funds extended little power and representation to the recipient in their 
design phases or governance structures.  
 
In spite of this, climate financing has departed significantly from this age-old 
international aid tradition; mostly, because action to combat the negative impacts related 
to climate change is not perceived as falling under the mandate of regular development 
aid. In contrast, climate finance is seen as a debt incurred by the industrialized countries 





developing countries. In this sense, climate change reverses the role-play between the 
North and the South. In 1992, nearing the end of the UNCED conference developing 
countries condemned GEF for the imbalanced and inequitable governance structure and 
the limited focus of the mandate on global commons problems (countries demanded 
financial avenues for sustainable development to be a part of the GEF mandate) 
(Keohane & Levy, 1996). In opposition to this, the developed countries resisted making 
any changes – they insisted on retaining substantial authority over GEF‘s processes, 
maintaining a focus on global commons problems, and preserving significant leadership 
roles for the World Bank (Keohane & Levy, 1996). Fearing a political failure and 
collapse of the negotiation process, both blocs of countries decided to restructure the GEF 
and address the concerns raised. The restructured GEF was a significant improvement on 
the pilot one (and more on its specific features are discussed in the UNFCCC chapter).  
 
Despite restructuring, however, assessments of GEF reported many weaknesses of the 
institute. First, critiques have argued that GEF lacks technical adequacy, in terms of 
efficiency, fairness and responsiveness to developing countries needs (or adherence to 
guidance from the Convention). Some countries have complained about the excessive 
delays and costs involved in the preparation, approval and disbursement of funds for the 
project. Delays partially occur due to legitimate demands for transparency (which 
necessitate the publication of all project documents on the internet and the providing 
space for consultation of on project design, implementation and procedures for GEF 
decision-making) and the complex procedure for calculating incremental costs, which is 
criticized for being inconsistent and inflexible (Huq & Reid, 2004 & Klein et.al, 2008). 
 
Delays also occur due to poor implementation guidance provided the Parties to the 
Convention and the complex design of the funds (Mace, 2005 & 2007, Ballesteros et.al, 
2010a). The COP and the GEF council are tied together through a vaguely worded 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which gives significant liberty to GEF in 
performing its operations, but at the expense of its accountability to GEF (Ballesteros 
et.al, 2010a). 
 
As with GEF, other institutional or development partners involved in implementing the 
Convention must be made accountable for their actions. In particular, GEF is showing 
greater interest in reaping co-financing benefits from their collaboration with the private 
sector. Concerns have been raised that with increasing association between the GEF and 
the private sector, in the absence of a legal definition of the relationships between the 
COP, GEF and the private sector, can produce ambiguities over the future role and power 
share of the private sector (Ervine, 2007). 
 
Critiques have also expressed their disapproval of the scheme by which GEF disburses its 
resources. According to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, eligible developing 
countries must be provided with grant funding to cover the ―full agreed incremental 
costs‖ of measures taken to implement their commitments (Article 4, UNFCCC, 
1992).There have been inconsistencies in determining and applying this principle across 
GEF projects. Since 2005, GEF has mostly adhered to another scheme, the Resource 





is heavily denounced by many developing and developed countries, including some 
donor countries (Ballesteros et.al, 2010a). The eligibility criteria essentially allocates  
GEF resources on the basis of a country‘s potential to generate global environmental 
benefits and their capacities to successfully implement GEF projects and programs 
(Ballesteros et.al, 2010a & Ervine, 2007).  
 
This is especially frustrating given the low levels of funds available to GEF, which also 
opens discussion on co-financing. While co-financing can provide greater levels of 
resources for supporting adaptation activities, the difficulty of tracking the flow, type 
(loans or grants), theme (adaptation or mitigation) and the quantity of climate aid 
provided becomes difficult. Although efforts have been made to clarify this distinction – 
for example by the recent requirement of the UNFCCC reporting guidelines for donor 
countries to furnish information on climate related aid to GEF, bilateral, regional and 
multilateral channels and the recent OECD DAC requirements for reporting on all Rio 
Conventions – this still remains a problem (Ballesteros et.al, 2010a). 
 
Finally, significant proportion of scarce GEF resources are depleted due to the high costs 
of implementing agencies. A South Center report discovered that LDCF and the SCCF 
funds lose 10.52% and 18.49% of the total approved sum for a project in additional 
charges incurred due to high fees of implementing agencies and the corporate budget (for 
administrative purposes of the secretariat and the trustee) (South Centre, 2008). 
 
5.6 Disbursing Adaptation Finance 
This section discusses issues related to the delivery adaptation finance. 
 
Characteristics of Supported Projects 
 
Poverty and Climate Change: Reducing the Vulnerability of the Poor through Adaptation 
(2003) is jointly prepared by ten bilateral and multilateral development institutes. The 
report spotlighted the ―need to integrate responses to climate change and adaptation 
measures into strategies for poverty reduction to ensure sustainable development‖ 
Another report in 2003, made similar conclusions and asserted that vulnerability and 
resilience to climatic stresses on human and environmental systems, must be a central 
component of any adaptation strategy (Turner et al, 2003). The idea behind these and 
similar works (Oxfam, 2009) is that factors that influence vulnerability to climate change 
are not solely ecological or climate-related; social, economical and political dimensions 
are equally capable of determining a community‘s vulnerability or resilience to climate 
change and variability. In fact, a World Resources Institutes study, Weathering the 
Storm: Options for Framing Adaptation and Development, which reviewed over 100 so-
called ―adaptation‖ initiatives in developing countries, deduced that there is very little 
difference between these initiatives and good development practices (McGray, Hammill, 
Bradley, Schipper, & Parry, 2007). According to the study, the difference lies more in 
how the problem is stated than how solutions are implemented. In effect, adaptation can 
be seen as a continuum ranging from narrowly defined ―stand-alone‖ (McGray et.al, 





to more broadly defined ―mainstreamed‖ or ―horizontal‖ activities (OECD, n.d & 
McGray,  Hammill, Bradley, Schipper, & Parry, 2007).  
 
Successful adaptation integrates anticipated climate change impacts into the ongoing 
national and sectoral plans (Huq & Burton 2003, Agrawala, 2004). It should, therefore, 
promote sustainable livelihoods, ensure equitable growth, and enable better governance. 
Scholars have labeled this concept of integrating adaptation into ongoing national, sub-
national and sectoral plans as ―mainstreaming‖.  Responding to growing awareness of the 
intrinsic link between adaptation and development, many prominent international bodies 
noted the importance of incorporating adaptation into a development context, and 
released plans to take steps in this direction (for example, the OECD‘s 2006 Framework 
for Common Action Around Shared Goals, which was adopted by development and 
environmental ministers of OECD countries (OECD, 2006a)).  
 
Even though the importance of integrating adaptation and development planning is 
recognized at a conceptual level, the UNFCCC is yet to apply this strategy in its works. 
There are two fundamental issues that have resulted in this dichotomy between the 
conception and operation of mainstreaming. First, lies in the definition of the word in a 
UNFCCC context. Kartha et.al (2006) point that mainstreaming has appeared in two 
distinct sense in discussions – one, mainstreaming adaptation into development, which 
involves raising awareness of planners and practitioner of development work to enhance 
their capacity to understand and integrate climate change considerations in their work; 
and two, mainstreaming adaptation funding, which involves using ODA resources for 
climate change adaptation. The latter of the two connotations lies at the heart of the 
debate on mainstreaming adaptation.  
 
Problems arise for two related reasons. First, the climate change convention has specified 
the use of new and additional resources to cover agreed incremental costs of climate 
change projects. Therefore UNFCCC does not provide funds, at least in the shape of 
grants, to cover baseline costs of investments. As pointed out earlier, in addition to being 
very difficult to implement, the incremental cost principle unable to adequately capture 
the benefits of mainstreamed adaptation (Gomez-Echeverri, 2009 & Streck, n.d.). For 
mainstreamed adaptation, the difficulty of assessing incremental costs are heightened 
because of the complexities in quantifying environmental benefits (by contrast, benefits 
for mitigation projects can be quantified using standard units like tonnage of carbon 
dioxide saved). Moreover, many adaptation projects don‘t qualify for aid from GEF, 
because of the intrinsically local nature of adaptation, which makes it difficult to 
demonstrate their global environmental benefits. Least Developed Countries have raised 
concerns over the application of incremental costs for adaptation project, after which the 
COP requested the GEF to make the concept ―more understandable‖ (Decision 5/CP.8) 
and ―reduce the requirements for showing adaptation-additionality of proposed projects‖ 
(Decision 5/CP.14).  
 
As with the incremental costs, complications have arisen in determining the relationship 
between mainstreaming ODA for development and climate change funds mandated by 





donors can divert money from existing ODA for climate change, thereby neither 
providing new and additional resources for climate change, nor avoiding the diminution 
of already insufficient development assistance. Evidence suggests that these concerns are 
not unreasonable as there have been cases of channeling or relabeling ODA for the 
purposes of fulfilling commitment under the Convention (the most recent one is 
swindling money from ODA to meet the Copenhagen fast-start requirements (Ballesteros 




For adaptation, as argued above, horizontal approaches are most apt; they allow for 
greater national ownership and prevent developed countries from micro-managing project 
implementation, impose lower transaction costs for recipient countries, and provide a 
more holistic coverage to adaptation issues by including greater factors of vulnerability to 
climate change (Wilks, 2010). Moreover, horizontal approaches may enable countries to 
harmonize various donor activities from the start. Because of the multiplicity and 
fragmentation of international aid in developing countries, recipients waste precious 
resources and time understanding and complying with the specific requirement (like 
reporting) (Mitchell et.al, 2009).   
 
For a greater and more successful implementation of horizontal approaches, the 
leadership and ownership of national governments in the design and the implementation 
of adaptation program is a must (Wilks, 2010). National ownership is also enshrined in 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, and, as many scholars agree, is important for 
the successful identification and inclusion of national priorities in adaptation programs 
and coordination of national sectors and stakeholders in implementing concrete 
adaptation actions (Brown & Kaur, 2009, Wilks, 2010, & Ballesteros et.al, 2010a). 
National ownership also facilitates the alignment of adaptation action into general 
development. With adaptation strategies properly identified with and ingrained in 
national priorities, the predictability and the flow of funds for adaptation programs and 
the accountability of governments to its citizens is also likely to improve (Wilks, 2010).  
 
Brown & Kaur (2009) point out, that to improve the ownership of programs, a 
fundamental shift is required in donor-led decision making processes. In fact, the extent 
to which recipient country stakeholders (including officials from all the relevant sectors) 
are included in governance frameworks of international adaptation funds, and the extent 
to which the recipient nations consult and represent all relevant national stakeholder 
(including private sector and vulnerable communities) will determine the degree to which 
a recipient country owns its adaptation programs. Country ownership sometimes denotes 
democratic ownership, emphasizing the importance of representing civil societies and 
elected officials. Evidently, achieving national ownership in this sense, thorough 
consultation and participation of diverse stakeholders can delay access to funds. Despite 
this, many CSOs note that the benefits gained from this process make it worthwhile 






Alongside country-ownership of adaptation programs, country leadership in designing 
adaptation programs and setting program priorities is also a key. For a long time, 
multilateral and bilateral institutes have furthered their country strategies and program 
priorities (Wilks, 2010). Because of the pervasive nature of adaptation, national 
governments must play a central role in designing adaptation programs. Moreover, 
irrelevant economic and policy conditionalities, such as privatization, trade liberalization 
and deregulation, must not accompany any eligibility criteria for adaptation funding. 
 
Another principle that‘s advocated by aid effectiveness appropriate for the disbursal of 
climate finance is direct access. The concept describes the ability of recipient countries to 
access resources from a multilateral or bilateral fund directly or designate a national 
institute to receive these resources. There are multiple benefits to direct access, including 
reduction in transaction costs (incurred due to the high fees of multilateral implementing 
entities); streamlining access to adaptation fund by trimming bureaucratic requirements; 
speeding the process and the delivery of desired results; amplification in the national 
ownership, oversight and involvement of adaptation activities; and possibly strengthening 
the accountability of recipients to the Fund (Brown et.al, 2010b).   
 
The only multilateral adaptation mechanism that has provided direct access is the 
Adaptation Fund (Decision 1/CMP. 3) Being a pioneer, therefore, the Adaptation Fund 
(AF) offers ample lessons to improve direct access for adaptation programs to recipient 
countries. First, it pinpoints the lack of capacity in some countries that obstruct them 
from gaining direct access. Because the AF allots money on a first-come, first-serve basis 
and does not allocate resources to improve the capacities of national institutes, many 
developing countries resort to multilateral implementing entities. The budget constraints 
of AF hinder it from pursuing development of such capacities in developing countries. 
However, the AF has sort cooperation from multilateral and bilateral development 
agencies for advancing capacities of national institutes to manage adaptation funds. 
Special attention must be catered to least developed countries that have severe capacity 
constraints, and without targeted support, they may not establish accredited national 
entities in the near future.  
 
For the successful implementation of adaptation programs, there is also a need for 
sufficient adaptive capacity to absorb and employ funds for successfully achieving the 
end goals. Furthermore, care must be taken to avoid corruption risks in developing 
countries. A UNDP report outlines three corruption risks for adaptation activities in 
particular, which should be avoided. One, states can ―capture and abuse…[the] process of 
adaptation planning, , resulting in prioritization of projects and programs favoring vested 
interests rather than areas of greatest vulnerability ‖. Two, small levels of corruption (e.g. 
demand of bribe from a government official) can add to the cost of adaptation activities 
and reduce their effectiveness. Finally, ―bribery, clientelism and cronyism‖ can lead to 
poorly designed or executed programs (United Nations Development Program [UNDP], 
2010). 
 
However, it must be pointed out that donors have used the lack of certainty about the 
funding needs for adaptation in developing countries and the lack adaptive capacity in 





precluding further delays, there is a need to urgently furnish funds for adaptation, and 
simultaneously build adaptive capacity to ensure the proper use of these monies (Muller, 
2008).  
 
Adaptation also severely handicaps the effectiveness of blueprint approaches. For success 
of programs, it is vital to design and implement adaptation programs in accordance with 
its specific country context. This is partially the reason why it is so essential to adopt a 
country-led and country-owned strategy for climate change adaptation. Furthermore, it is 
realized that there are a number of delivery options, such as through the civil society, 
regional and UN organizations, and the state. Again, limits on flexibility of politically-
unstable states must be placed to ensure that the intended recipients benefits from climate 
finance. This could also apply to states where marginalized communities are not well 
represented in the government and secluded from state ventures (Mitchell, Anderson, & 
Huq 2009).  
 
For a sound delivery system, the international community must fill in the identified 
knowledge gaps. First, further clarity is required to define allocation criteria for 
adaptation and its scope. This includes agreeing on a set of parameters (like a country‘s 
socio-economic development levels, absorptive capacity, political stability, vulnerability, 
etc) and guidelines to efficiently distribute needs-based finance. Furthermore, greater 
understanding is necessary to determine what proportions of total costs of adaptation 
programs and projects can be funded with multilateral aid, and whether it is feasible to 
calculate and employ the incremental costs principle alone. There is also a need for a 
more refined assessment of the both the types and suitability of various financial 
instruments (like grants, loans, guarantees, etc) to individual adaptation programs, and an 
evaluation of both the supply and demand of various financial instruments. This may also 
help in appropriately co-financing adaptation programs and generally improve the overall 





















6.0 Analysis of the CIFs in light of adaptation financing needs 
 
Codes and concepts from the document analysis (previous three chapters) and interviews 
were organized along three issues – funding, institutional and governance issues. Funding 
issues delved with ideas related to the mobilization and disbursal of climate finance. 
Institutional issues discussed the interactions between the CIF and the UNFCCC as 
avenues for the flow of climate funds. Governance issues examined themes related to 
power share and decision-making arrangements in these institutes.  
 
There is a considerable overlap between these themes. For example, depending on the 
governance structure of a particular institute, the methods of mobilizing, managing, and 
disbursing funds can alter significantly. Institutes with greater representation of different 
stakeholders and a more equitable allocation of power will resort to more democratic 
principles (which reflect the concerns of all stakeholders) of mobilizing, managing and 
disbursing climate finance. 
  
6.1 Funding Issues 
 
New and Additional  
 
The CIF have emerged in the absence of an agreed baseline for classifying 
―additionality‖ of resources mobilized by the UNFCCC. Neither do the CIF create any 
standard mechanism of counting contributions made to their trust funds (for example, by 
asking donors to adhere to a base year while counting their classifying their climate aid as 
―new‖), so that the resources are known to be new and additional. Ari Huhtala, Senior 
Environmental Specialist at the World Bank, highlighted some of the difficulties that a 
deficiency of a standard additionality definition creates (personal communication, 
November 10
th
, 2010):  
 
They [donors] are now presenting information on their pledges what is fast-start 
finance, but there is no agreed definition on what is new and additional and there 
is no comparability between the pledges. So, in fact every donor can set their own 
standards for what is new and additional, and understandably developing 
countries do not agree with some of the definitions. 
 
In the CIF too, donors can individually determine (if they chose to) whether their 
contributions are new and additional to ODA. Not only is it uncertain whether the 
contributions are new, but it is also impossible to compare between the resources 
provided by different donors for climate change. Based on the policies of individual 
donor countries, some countries may or may not provide new and additional resources. 
For the integrity of the CIF governance structure, it is even more important to ensure that 
these comparisons are accurately made, since the CIF allots seats on its governing bodies 
on the basis of the minimum contributions made by a donor.   
 
Because the minimum amount required to qualify a contributing country for a seat in 





countries, the problems faced by individual donor countries are not prominent. However, 
the clash between developed and developing countries during international circles is 
unmistakably conspicuous. As was discussed earlier, agreeing and complying by a 
common definition for additionality would be important for building trust between 
countries. Inability to agree whether the substantial amounts of resources in the CIF are 
actually new and additional has further fractured the trust between developed and 
developing countries. 
 
In lieu of providing a solution for the international debate on new and additional finance, 
the CIF in fact add another layer of complexity. The CIF are experimenting with newer 
avenues of finance, specifically through MDBs and the private sector, and generating 
significant sources from these channels. For example, the World Bank claims that the 
USD 3 billion allocated for the CIF in 2009 leveraged an additional USD 27 billion, 
around 30% of which were derived from private sector (as cited in Marston, 2010). It is 
unclear whether funds from private sector would be counted as climate aid from a 
particular developed country. 
 
Although the CIF (or the World Bank) should not impose a definition of new and 
additional on the UNFCCC, they could have implemented several procedures that would 
ensure a standard accounting mechanism for its resources, and especially highlight how 
they are new and additional. Oxfam enlists three principles for assuring additionality and 
avoiding diversion from ODA resources: binding annual commitments from the donors, a 
compliance mechanism with penalty provisions to ascertain whether donors have 
delivered pledged resources and a revision of ODA DAC rules so that ODA is easily 
distinguished from climate finance (Oxfam, 2009). While the latter requirement may be 
out of the scope of CIF mandate, the Funds have not made any arrangements for the 
former two either. The CIF could have also made provisions for greater transparency 
from donor governments on the methods used for counting their finance. 
 
Adequacy and Predictability  
 
Related to a lack of definition and mechanism for ensuring additionality of funds, is the 
lack of adequacy and predictability of the CIF funds for supported programs. Adequacy 
and predictability are especially important parameters for adaptation programs, because 
these are integrated into the country‘s development programs. In other words, funds need 
to be reliable. Programs need to be consistently funded for a time period before they can 
be self-sustaining.  
 
Most climate funds have failed to be adequate and predictable, because they rely heavily 
on voluntary contributions from donors. This is again another area in which the CIF are 
simply repeating past mistakes; with the only exception of Adaptation Fund (that draws 
its resources from a 2% levy on the proceeds of Clean Development Mechanism), all 
other UNFCCC funds are run on voluntary contributions from donors. For many, this is 
an unacceptable practice, because climate finance is seen as debt incurred by developed 






In addition to not being predictable, voluntary contributions give significant power to the 
donors. Donors, for example, can impose strong conditions before renewing their funds. 
This is what happened during the fourth replenishment period of the GEF when the US 
threatened to not renew its contributions to the GEF unless it adopts their proposed 
framework for allocating resources (Ervine, 2007).  
   
In comparison to mitigation, it has been even more difficult to raise funds for adaptation. 
This is despite the fact that the UNFCCC negotiations have concluded the need for a 
balanced allocation of funds between mitigation and adaptation. Moore Rawleston 
expressed this concern, and pointed to some reasons for this during his interview. There 
are fewer investment possibilities in adaptation than in mitigation, therefore it‘s more 
difficult to involve development partners (like development banks) and private sector 
(personal communication, November 4
th
, 2010). The diagram below captures the 
discrepancy between the funding for adaptation and mitigation in the CIF. Because the 
CIF represent a significant portion of climate finance, more money should be devoted to 
adaptation measures. They should also adhere to the specification for a balanced 
allocation of resources between mitigation and adaptation
10
 (UNFCCC, 2010).     
 
Finally, while the CIF guarantee grants for constructing investment plans for adaptation 
work in pilot countries, there isn‘t a guaranteed support for implementing these national 
plans. It is evident that most of the funds for implementing adaptation plans are coming 
from outside the PPCR (through MDBs). Although investment plans may become useful 
in future in coordinating funding (assuming they are made with equal and rigorous 
involvement of all relevant national stakeholders), the PPCR does not have adequate 




















                                               
10 The UNFCCC also fail to provide a balanced allocation of resources between mitigation and adaptation, 





Source: CIF, 2010a & CIF 2010b 
Figure 6.1: Adaptation vs. Mitigation Funding in CIF 
 
 
 Figure 6.1: Adaptation is a much smaller focus of the CIF. 
 
 
Sources of Climate Finance  
 
The high-level Advisory Group, which was specially commissioned by UN General 
Secretary, Ban Ki-Moon, to provide recommendations on mobilizing new and additional 
resources for climate change categorized four kinds of sources for climate finance: public 
sources for grants (including taxation and auctioning of emission allowances, removal of 
fossil fuel subsidies, other new taxes such as a financial transactions, taxation and general 
public revenues through direct budget contributions), development bank type 
instruments, carbon market finance and private capital. With the involvement of 
development banks and private sectors, the CIF are generating useful lessons in 
mobilizing financing from these two avenues. Many scholars and the AGF have also 
pointed to the scope of generating significant funds from other innovative sources like 
public carbon markets, international aviation and maritime transportation and financial 
transactions (Baudenville 2010, Hallegatte, 2008, Ballesteros et.al, 2010). The CIF can 
expand its portfolio to also experiment with these sources of finance. There is special 
interest in these sources, because they will make climate finance more predictable by 
shifting away from reliance on voluntary donor contributions. 
 
It is also important to note that for the World Bank, working with other MDBs and 
private sector is not new. They have been collaborating with these partners for many 
years now. This raises an important concern. The nature of relationship between the 
World Bank and the MDBs or private sectors is quite different from the same between 
UNFCCC and the said development partners. Therefore, it is questionable whether the 
lessons generated by CIF, when they closely involve the private sector and the MDBs, 
will be completely replicable in a UNFCCC context. For example, the CIF Sub-









committees may grant greater levels of freedom to the MDBs and the private sector than 
the COP would be able to (given that it contains a larger number of stakeholders with 
differing takes on the roles of private sector and other MDBs in climate finance).  
 
Financing Instruments  
 
Financial instruments are not neutral. The type of financial instruments and their 
accompanying terms of usage can greatly influence the nature and effectiveness of 
development aid. For example, grants and concessional loans that carry unfair conditions, 
reflecting only donor interests, can place huge burdens on recipient countries, which can 
slow their overall socio-economic growth. Risk sharing instruments like guarantees and 
equities may in fact enhance risks for host countries (Honkaniemi, 2011). Therefore, it is 
highly important that the terms and conditions of each financial instrument is thoroughly 
reviewed and assessed to avoid risks. While it is sufficient for these agreements to be 
made between the lender, the borrower and the financial institute that executes the 
transfer of resources; for climate change this information needs to be shared more widely, 
because the issue involves many stakeholders. Sharing information so broadly is 
especially important for public sector monies, because of the government‘s accountability 
to its constituents. Unfortunately, the CIF provide only very general information about 
the terms of use and the concessionality of the disbursed instruments for projects 
(Honkaniemi, 2011).  
 
Donors pledged most of their resources as grants to the CIF trust funds, as depicted 


























Figure 6.2: Distribution of Total Pledged Resources and Grants in the CIF and the 
Percentage of Grants in Each Fund. 
 
Source: CIF 2010c & CIF 2010d  
 
Figure 6.2: The Figure shows two things – first that the share of CTF is comparatively larger 
than that of other funds, and second that the grant element of PPCR (sole adaptation 




From the closeness between the loan component of the PPCR and CTF, it is clear that the 
donors have not discriminated between mitigation and adaptation (through the reasoning 
that the latter can attract investment because of its potential to quickly generate revenue), 
while pledging resources. In fact, of the total USD 6.1 billion pledged by donors, only 
USD 951 million are provided as loans
12
 (CIF 2010c & CIF 2010d).   
 
Although most CIF resources are provided by the donors as grants, most of these, about 
5/6ths, will be disbursed as loans (Honkaniemi, 2011).The World Bank does not really 
provide any rationale as to why the CIF funds are mostly disbursed as loans, when they 
are provided to the trust funds as grants.   
 
The concessionality of loans for CIF can range from 45% (which are considered as hard 
loans and are barely concessional at all) to 75% (which are considered as soft loans and 
comparable to IDA instruments)
13
 (Honkaniemi, 2011). While there is this general 
information on the concessional element of the funding instruments, no specific 
information is available for a particular project. The lack of specific data on the ratio of 
loans to grants for projects is worrisome for numerous reasons. First, many of the CIF 
pilot countries are highly debt-ridden countries, especially those which are receiving 
financing from the PPCR window (see Figure 6.3).  
                                               
11 Only the CTF receives contributions as loans; the other funds receive a mix of grants and capital. 
12 Around USD 1324 million of the pledged resources are provided as Capital.  
13 PPCR financing modalities proposes that the loans for PPCR contain a 75% grant element (CIF, 2010c) 
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Figure 6.3: External Debt and Approved CTF funding for Countries  
 
Source: CIF, 2010a & Central Intelligence Agency, n.d 
 
Figure 6.3: This Figure shows that developing countries with high debt are accessing resources 
from CTF Trust Fund. It must be emphasized that the Figure only displays the amount of funds 
that the countries receive from the CTF Trust Fund, not the total amount of resources that are 
funding CTF projects in these countries. This total is likely to be significantly higher than the 
amount presented here, and is also mainly in form of loans. Therefore, the success or failures of 
the CTF projects can have great implications for the financial stability of these countries.  
 
Second, without specific information on the concessionality and terms of use of resources 
for projects, it is hard to decipher how much risk these countries are acquiring through 
the CIF. It must be noted, however, that the CIF do provide some form of assurance in 
this regard to the international community – they assert that the financing modalities are 
set-up to distribute resources to heavily indebted poor countries and vulnerable countries 
on a more concessional basis. For PPCR and FIP funds, 63% and 71% of total financing 
is disbursed in the form of grants (Honkaniemi, 2011), and the PPCR permits countries 
from opting to not accept any form of loan (CIF, 2010c). Still, it cannot be ignored that 
seven of the eighteen countries supported by PPCR will receive loans at the risk of debt 
distress (Honkaniemi, 2011). Third, it is itself questionable whether providing loans 
(regardless of their grant element) for adaptation to climate change is justified.  
 
As of November 10, 2010, three countries have embarked on Phase II of the PPCR, and 
investment plans worth around USD 50 million dollars have been approved (CIF, n.d.b). 
To generate adequate sources, the USD 50 million grant from PPCR is blended with 
other funds from within and outside of the CIF that contain a much larger loan 
component. For example, Bangladesh receives USD 49 million as PPCR grants, USD 60 












































































































































million as PPCR loans, USD 300 million as IDA loans and USD 215 million as ADB 
loans. Given that the larger share of resources may come from channels outside of the 
PPCR, as in the case of Bangladesh, questions about the legitimacy of those channels are 
raised. For example, what special terms and conditions are attached to the portions of 
money coming from IDA or ADB pockets, in the case of Bangladesh? Who are these 
foreign institutes (which are not directly related to the CIF funds) accountable to? 
Without any transparent information on the specific modalities for financial transfer, 
skepticism and genuine concern over the influence of these loans on recipient countries 
will prevail.  
 
Private Sector Involvement  
 
There are many ambiguities with regards to the financing provided by the private sector. 
Information is sealed by strict non-disclosure agreements between the Trust Fund 
Committee and the involved corporation for obvious business reasons (CIF, 2010c). 
Guidelines on financing modalities for private sector are very generic, and considering 
the fact that each agreement is prepared distinctively on a case-by-case basis, they are of 
not very insightful. The necessity of private sector involvement in climate finance 
(because of their ability to achieve good leveraging ratios and generate significant 
financing) is recognized widely in international circles, and therefore the CIF efforts of 
encouraging private sector participation are hailed by many. However, some issues must 
be addressed. One, it must be ensured that the private sectors maintain a high standard of 
development effectiveness and responsible financing. Private sectors tend to focus on 
short terms financial gains and may be tempted to use risky business strategies. It must be 
ensured that these risks are not transferred over to vulnerable communities. Also, private 
sectors‘ need for quick financial gains must not distract from the objective of 
safeguarding the most vulnerable communities against climate change. Private sectors 
mostly operate without any stringent environmental and social safeguards. Therefore, the 
CIF, in collaboration with recipient country governments, must create mechanisms to 
ensure that CIF resources are being productively and primarily used to promote low-
carbon growth and climate-resiliency. Further, it is important to maintain a balance 
between building local business capacity and providing support to the most appropriate 
private company with expertise in climate-related actions. Concerns exist that much of 
the finances available through CIF will only subsidize northern private companies, which 
can jeopardize the ability of local private companies from building experience in 
resolving climate change activities (Honkaniemi, 2011). Finally, if private sectors are 
involved in the process, there is also a need to define the relationships of the private 
sector with the CIF Trust Fund Committee, the recipient country, and the COP (since the 
money provided by the company may be used for fulfilling a country‘s UNFCCC 
obligations). This concern has been raised earlier with the involvement of GEF in private 
sector. For example, Ervine (2007) argues that the keen interest of GEF in reaping co-
financing benefits from the involvement of private sector can produce ambiguities over 
the future role and the power share of the private sector.  
 






The most basic eligibility requirements for recipient countries are that they must be 
eligible for ODA funding in accordance the OECD/DAC guidelines, and that they must 
house an active MDB program. Neither of these factors, especially the latter one, is 
directly related to the needs of adaptation finance. Amongst the countries that meet the 
mentioned criteria, only a few are essentially handpicked by the donor countries after 
recommendations from the CIF‘s Expert Group. The guiding questions that are supplied 
by the PPCR Sub-committee to its expert advisory group for selecting pilot countries 
offer insights into the priorities of PPCR. The Sub-committee provides eight guiding 
questions, and as the PPCR Expert Group points, many of these question are appropriate 
for assessing the success of the PPCR, rather than setting its eligibility criteria for country 
selection (CIF, 2009). While the criteria has parameters for ensuring diversity (in terms 
of geographic distribution, governance factors and hazard exposure) and accounting for 
vulnerability; there are other parameters in place which at best may ensure the success of 
the PPCR, and at worst may weaken the program‘s ability to contribute positively to 
adaptation by obstructing outreach to the most vulnerable countries and communities. In 
particular, country preparedness, replicability and sustainability and coherence and value 
addition are not appropriate factors (CIF, 2009). These factors hunt for those countries 
that have the ability to produce rapid and replicable results due to an existing policy or 
institutional capacity; who are preferably receiving external funds and have focused 
domestic adaptation programs which improve the chances of attaining good leveraging 
ratios and significant funds; and have a political or institutional environment that 
maximize the successes of PPCR programs. All these factors are most suited in a results 
framework as indicators for monitoring the effectiveness of the PPCR. The fact that these 
feature in the eligibility criteria highlights the desperation of the Sub-committee to 
generate successful results, and thereby, strengthen its bid for a strong role in a post-2012 
climate finance regime.  
 
Integrated Approaches  
 
The need to integrate climate change adaptation into national development strategies has 
been highlighted by several scholars, UN papers, and civil society bodies alike. With a 
strong emphasis placed on programmatic approach, there is greater likelihood that the 
CIF will support development goals alongside climate change responses. More on this 
can only be said after the investment plans are implemented. The first few investment 
plans, however, have depicted a great diversity in the degree to which countries are 
adhering to a more holistic, horizontal approach that creates win-win solutions for 
climate change and sustainable development. The CTF investment plans of Mexico and 
South Africa are good examples. Whereas the Mexican plan takes a more holistic 
approach emphasizing issues of institutional capacity and governance, the South African 
plan only notes the importance of such issues (Nakhooda, 2010).  
 
There are, however, concerns over mainstreamed approaches too. With the close link 
with development, there are concerns that these responses may divert ODA for climate 
adaptation projects. Therefore, this offers another reason why CIF must formulate and 






Aid Effectiveness  
 
The CIF make a cautious attempt to abide by some of the features of aid effectiveness. 
Particularly, CIF are adopting more programmatic (or horizontal) versus project-based 
approaches and promoting country ownership and country leadership of these 
approaches. The success of the CIF in upholding these principles can only be commented 
on when programs become implemented and deliver results. With regards to country 
ownership and country leadership, it is noteworthy that the dominance of MDBs role in 
the entire CIF process builds a sense of, at best, co-ownership of the programs between 
the countries and the MDBs. Furthermore, as literature suggests (Ballesteros et.al, 2010), 
the national ownership of investment plans can be enhanced if relevant stakeholders from 
the recipient countries (especially representatives of vulnerable communities) are 
involved in the CIF process, including while developing and implementing proposal and 
investment plans. However, a recent review indicates that the involvement of all relevant 
stakeholders (beyond finance and environmental ministries) is lacking in the development 
of investment plans (Radner, 2010). This is partially due to the rapid pace at which the 
plans are being furnished.  
 
Direct Access  
 
Scholars have also championed the idea of direct access. But, by channeling the funds 
through the MDBs, CIF can only provide a facilitated access to countries. With facilitated 
and indirect access of this sort, while the donors can be assured that their aid is in the 
hands of agencies with good fiduciary and environmental standards, the incentive and the 
ability of national institutes to improve or showcase their capacity to administer 
international finance is compromised. Because climate change is a long term issue that 
will require a sustained response, national entities need to be ultimately strengthened to 
administer and disburse climate funds, in accordance with national priorities. Portions of 
CIF funds could have usefully employed in building this capacity in developing 
countries. By channeling funds through the MDBs, the CIF are only prolonging the 
reliance of developing countries on these foreign institutes. In addition, because the funds 
are channeled through more institutes (CIF  MDBs  national/sub-national institutes), 
more money is spent on the fees of different implementing agencies.  
 
Measuring, Reporting and Verification  
 
The CIF have exclusively handed the task of implementing its programs to the MDBs, 
without any requirements for meeting fiduciary, environmental or social standards. While 
the foremost standard is generally good for multilateral development banks, they have 
been criticized for not enforcing strong social and environmental safeguards.  Therefore, 
a requirement to receive accreditation for these factors would have improved the 
legitimacy of partnering development banks, and also signaled Bank‘s attention to 
environmental and social issues. 
 
There are provisions for monitoring and reporting on the activities supported by the CIF. 





accumulate lessons learned.  However, the CIF leave the tasks of measuring and 
reporting its operations at the discretion of the MDBs. Although the MDBs are 
accountable to the CIF as they are mandated to report regularly on the progress of the 
activities, each MDB applies different tools and methodologies to fulfill their obligations. 
Because of a lack of standardized approach, it can become difficult to compare results. 
 
In relation to this, Ms. Ballesteros and her colleagues named two major institutional gaps. 
One, there is a need for an independent institution to perform an oversight function which 
ascertains, among other things, that there is a fair and balanced allocation of power and 
resources among the various countries and themes of climate change response system 
(mitigation and adaptation). Ballesteros also mentions that an independent entity, not the 
World Bank, can fulfill this oversight function. Literature has also pointed to the critical 
role that civil society bodies can play in monitoring climate finance, at least at a local 
level (Action Aid, 2009 and Ballesteros et.al, 2010a). Without such a system in place, it 
would be difficult to coordinate and monitor efforts of international community.  
 
6.2 Institutional Issues 
 
The massive scale of financial transfer that is anticipated for climate change has attracted 
a number of international institutes. The World Bank, amongst them, has been at the 
forefront in strengthening its position in its bid for a substantial role in climate finance. 
And in many ways, it has succeeded – the new green Fund for climate change has already 
designated the World Bank as its interim trustee. The CIF is an exercise of the World 
Bank that has significantly enhanced its role in international climate finance, and which 
also raises various questions on the suitability of the World Bank as a major financial 
institution for climate change. These questions are not new; from the onset, with the 
proposal of CIF, NGOs and southern government have bombarded the World Bank with 
criticism and suspicion over the new funds (Tan, 2008). Most of these critiques have 
either accused the CIF for hijacking the UNFCCC negotiation process, or have targeted 
the lack of aptness of the World Bank in administering climate change monies.  
 
Will the past repeat – will CIF cripple the ability of the COP to devise a new financial 
mechanism?  
 
While integration of climate change activities can be good, there is a concern that the CIF 
are a donor-driven intervention to place the World Bank and the MDBs as lead institutes 
for climate finance, undercutting the results of the UNFCCC negotiations. History is 
proof-enough that these concerns are not far-fetched
14
. In particular, there are striking 
similarities between the establishment of the CIF and the GEF. GEF was proposed during 
a joint ministerial meeting of the WBG and the IFC; likewise, the CIF also emerged from 
a series of meetings of the Development Committee of the World Bank. Once again to 
demonstrate their keen support, the developed country governments were quick to pledge 
                                               
14 In his analysis of the World Bank, Bruce Rich spotlights a number of contradictions in the Bank‘s 
response to international pressure from CSOs for a more environmentally sound development path (Rich, 
1990). 





a significant amount of money for the CIF (over USD 6 billion), as they did for the GEF 
(around USD 1 billion). Furthermore, similar to the GEF that was speedily launched just 
before the UNCED summit, where the discussions on a potential global environmental 
fund were to be held; CIF were instituted before a new UNFCCC financial mechanism 
has been finalized by the COP. Finally, like the GEF, CIF are only constructed as a pilot 
mechanism with a time limit of three years. GEF has lasted for almost two decades now, 
and despite its many drawbacks, it is the financial mechanism of four global 
environmental conventions, including climate change.  
 
It is not clear when the CIF programs will actually terminate. Although the sunset clause 
in CIF governance documents promises that the funds will discontinue after a new 
financial mechanism is established by the COP, a concrete date is not provided. 
Furthermore, while the COP had zero input into the decision to launch the CIF
15
, the 
UNFCCC are authorized to extend its lifespan past 2012.  Needless to say (as it is already 
obvious from their support), donors would be very keen on doing so (Marston, 2010). 
Whether the CIF will stick to their deadline or not, it is clear that the programs and 
projects funded by CIF will live for a much longer time.  Some of the loans disbursed by 
the CIF have payback period of forty years, and it is neither certain who will collect the 
interests from these loans, nor how those loans will be used (CIF, 2010c).  
 
The similarities between the development paths of the GEF and CIF cause concern that 
the CIF may preempt COP negotiations and snatch the opportunity from the COP to 
establish a new financial mechanism, just as the GEF tried to do once before (at the 
UNCED conference, before it was agreed to be restructured).  During the UNCED, the 
original GEF attempted to seize the ability of developing countries to create a global 
environmental fund through a more rigorous and inclusive process.  
 
While the CIF repeatedly mention that they will not undermine the UNFCCC 
negotiations, there are reasons to believe otherwise. The most obvious one is the disparity 
in the resource base for the UNFCCC and CIF (see Figure 6.1). In contrast to the 
difficulty encountered during UNFCCC negotiations to convince donors to pledge funds 
for climate change, developed countries have rather willingly promised USD 6.1 billion 
for CIF. The sheer size of this resource base mocks all the other climate finance 
mechanisms. Second, although the CIF are not directly linked to the UNFCCC financial 
mechanism, many donor countries are fulfilling their financial obligations under the 
Convention or related protocols and agreements by channeling resources through the CIF. 
A WRI study indicates that a significant portion of the Copenhagen Accord‘s fast-start 
finance is being channeled through the CIF (Ballesteros et.al., 2010b). Finally, a leaked 
document from the Katherine Sierra, vice president of the Sustainable Development 
Network at the World Bank Group (WBG), bluntly states the intention of the Bank for a 
                                               
15
 In a closed door preparatory meeting in Osaka, Japan for the 34
th
 G8 summit, heads of state and finance 
ministers agreed to establish Climate Investment Funds to compliment meeting of heads of existing 
bilateral and multilateral efforts, until a post-2012 framework under the UNFCCC is implemented. Shortly 
thereafter, in a press release, the World Bank asserted that representatives of 40 developed and developing 
countries have reached an agreement to create international investment funds that will provide financing for 
cleaner development paths and  to protect themselves for future impacts of climate change (Shamsuddoha 





main role in channeling fast-start finance through the CIF. The document also contains 
plans to secure a significant role for the Bank in future climate finance. Among other 
things, the plan ―includes an outreach campaign on the Bank‘s role in climate finance to 
ministries of finance; presidents' and prime ministers' offices; and ministries of 
environment and foreign affairs‖ (as quoted in Marston, 2010).  
 
With many developing countries are cheering the unique governance framework and 
other features of the Adaptation Fund (for example, provision of direct access to the 
funds), the emergence of CIF raises important questions. Richard Klein summed up the 
concerns of many developing countries and civil society organizations: ―why the World 
Bank just at the moment when the Adaptation Fund is becoming available is putting up 
an alternative Fund that is not under the guidance of the UNFCCC COP, but in a way 
competes with one of the funds that the developing countries have fought for very hard, 
namely the Adaptation Fund, which has a governance system that is considered to be 
more democratic than that of the CIF, and which is now obviously not seen as primary 
funding agent because the amount of money in the PPCR‖ (Richard Klein, personal 
communication, January 19
th
, 2011). Adaptation Fund, indeed, has many features that are 
commendable, like the ability of developing countries to access resources directly 
through an accredited (by the Adaptation Fund Board) nationally entity; a more balanced 
governance structure that has permanent reservations for least developed countries and 
Small Island States, as well as other geographically unique developing countries; 
provision of resources for adaptation as grants alone; and fast project cycle that makes a 
cautious attempt to obviate bureaucratic delays. 
 






Figure 6.4: Although the PPCR of the CIF is the most recent 
multilateral adaptation fund, it already contains more money than all 
the other funds combined. 
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Reasons why donors favor CIF  
 
The great disproportion between the resources for UNFCCC and CIF begs the question, 
why? And because the donors have not explicitly addressed this concern, one can only 
speculate as to why the donors have entrusted the World Bank in particular and other 
MDBs with so much climate finance. To some extent, with stronger fiduciary standards, 
the MDBs deserve the trust that donors impart on them. However, it can not be 
discounted that the donors are able to exercise more power through the governance 
regimes of MDBs, as most of these institutes award voting shares based on the 
contributions of its member countries, whereas the UN allocates votes equally among 
member countries. As such, developed countries are able to influence important 
parameters of programs supported by the MDBs, like setting programmatic and project 
priorities, eligibility criteria, enforcing strict regulatory measures, and determining the 
composition of funds. Even GEF, with a hybrid governance structure (that draws from 
both Bretton Woods and UN structures where a majority is defined as 60% all 
participating countries and representatives providing 60% of all GEF funding) has had to 
yield to the demands of its main contributors. During the fourth replenishment period, 
beside significant opposition from developing countries and even major European 
countries, the US was successful in imposing the highly-controversial Resource 
Allocation Framework for setting eligibility and funding criteria for GEF resources 
(Ervine, 2007).  
 
Furthermore, as Athena Ballesteros and her colleagues point out, most multilateral 
development institutes (be it UN-based or otherwise) grant enough informal power to 
donor countries that is exercised through the day-to-day work of secretariats, technical 
experts, program officers or implementing agencies and operating entities (Ballesteros 
et.al, 2010a). Unless COP provides rigorous guidelines to the MDBs on implementing 
programs for meeting commitments of individual countries under the UNFCCC, and 
holds these institutes liable for their actions, the power balance will always tipped 
towards the developed countries. Moreover, with greater formal power share in their 
governance systems, the donors can exercise even greater levels of informal power 
through development banks. Finally, the potential of MDBs to generate greater funds for 
climate change by leveraging donor contributions with other sources may also be 
attractive to the donor countries. The leveraging ratio for CTF projects is much higher 
that the GEF mitigation projects
16
. Generating resources in this way has two potential 
benefits for the donors. First, it alleviates the pressure on developed countries to generate 
a large amount of funds for climate change solely by themselves. Second, with more 
resources, developed countries are able to support large-scale and high impact programs 
through the CIF, which can be appealing to their constituencies. 
 
If CIF are eyeing a larger role in future climate financing (as seems to be the case), they 
should be subjected to similar levels of legitimacy as any UNFCCC financial mechanism 
would be. Ballesteros and colleagues have done an extensive piece on institutional 
                                               
16 The range of leverage ratio for CTF projects varies from 1:4 (South Africa) to 1:18 (Colombia). High 
leverage ratio indicates the extent of co-financing opportunities that the Bank is exploiting, however this 





legitimacy and outline its three pillars: power, responsibility and accountability (2010a). 
Any institute that plays a key role in administering climate finance must be assessed 
against these dimensions of legitimacy (see Figure 6.5).  
 
From this, it is clear that several attributes of the CIF will need to be drastically altered 
for it to be perceived as a legitimate funding mechanism, including altering its 
governance system to a more representative (with representatives from all COP 
members) and equitable (with more balance in governance structure that may include 
extending greater share of votes to non-Annex I countries, as they contain more COP 
members). In addition, a rigorous memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the 
COP and the CIF, which clarifies their legal relationship, and cements the authority of the 
COP will be necessary. Moreover, CIF would have to be made accountable to the COP, 
and required to submit regular reports of their operations and their impacts to the COP 
(Ballesteros et.al, 2010a). CIF would also have to align its objectives more formally with 
those of the COP, by identifying and fulfilling key gaps.  
 
Figure 6.5: Dimensions of Institutional Legitimacy 
 
 
Source: Ballesteros et.al (2010a) 
 
Figure 6.5: Ballesteros and her colleagues define three parameters of institutional legitimacy: 
power, responsibility, and accountability. Any financial mechanism with a significant role-
play in climate finance must be assessed in accordance to these dimensions.    
 
CIF - A Major MDB initiative that threatens UNFCCC?  
 
The CIF are mainly a multilateral development banks-run initiative, in which the World 
Bank Group assumes the lead role. These funds provide a platform for all the MDBs to 
coordinate their climate related activities to gain maximum experience in the field. 
Therefore, the CIF can be traced back to the 2005 G8 summit when the MDBs were 





renewable energy and low carbon growth in their activities, and the World Bank was 
asked to create a framework for clean energy and development. The goals of promoting 
energy efficiency, renewable energy and low carbon development are similar to that of 
the CIF. Additionally, the investment strategies developed by each MDB at the time can 
now contribute to coordination of MDB climate change activities to achieve the 
maximum benefit of climate change resources in the banks. The box below presents the 
similarities between the strategies for climate change of ADB, AfDB and IDB.  
 
Box 6.1: Similarities in Climate Strategies of MDBs 
Comparison between African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Inter-
American Development Bank 
 
1) Enhancing capacity building (institutional and technical) at national and local levels 
(including of local civil societies, financial institutes, and the national and local 
governments); 
2) Developing and implementing national and sub-national climate change strategies; 
3) Mobilizing significant sources by utilizing a variety of funding instruments, such as loans, 
grants, guarantees, and investment grants; enhancing and enabling private-sector 
involvement; and exercising a greater leveraging ratio by identifying newer sources of 
climate finance. 
4) Encouraging programmatic vs. project-based approaches; 
5) Increasing knowledge and technical know-how regarding climate change and promoting 
knowledge sharing; 
6) Involving key high-level government officials of recipient country, like finance ministers, 
earlier on in the process; 
7) Encouraging and increasing civil society participation; 
8) Measuring and monitoring their own GHG ―footprint‖ and mainstream mitigation and 
adaptation in selected, climate-sensitive sectors. The MDBs have varying monitoring and 
reporting provisions, and none are accountable to the COP. IDB allows donors to monitoring 
access for any project they fund, and will produce unaudited versions of activities approved 
in the previous year with only general account of the funding source and the project. The 
AfDB has developed a CRMA framework that is aligned with regional targets, and will 
monitor progress of - (i) its own investments, with regards to implementation of climate risk 
management and adaptation measures, for which the Bank will use normal reporting 
mechanisms; and (ii) country level outcomes related to climate resilience, for which the Bank 
will collaborate the with those who are ―specialized‖ in monitoring climate variability, such 
as the UNFCCC, IPCC, UNEP, etc; 
9) Are already undertaking large-scale climate-related projects and have established funds for 
addressing climate change adaptation and mitigation challenges (the governance of the fund 
will be chiefly compromised of ADB staff and development partners (donor agencies), and 
hence will depart strongly from the equality principles followed by UNFCCC and the CIF). 
Source: Inter-American Development Bank, 2010, African Development Bank, 2009, Asian Development 
Bank, 2011 
Box 6.1: The Box was created by extracting similar elements from the climate change strategies 









Role of the MDB in CIF 
 
From the onset and throughout the whole cycle, the MDBs are closely involved with the 
CIF process – they aid in the conduction of initial surveys to gauge at the usefulness of 
CIF funds to the recipient countries, support the development of national (or sub-
national) strategies and investment plans, prepare individuals projects springing from 
these investment plans, implement and monitor projects according to their own 
operational procedures and guidelines, and report on the impacts of these projects (again 
relying on their own abilities and using their own parameters) to the relevant Trust Fund 
Committees. With such intimate involvement in the entire process, the MDB will 
undoubtedly garner important experiences and will be well-placed for major role in the 
upcoming climate financing regime.  
 
Drawback of involving MDBs  
 
There are several drawbacks of involving the MDBs so closely in the CIF process. 
Inserting a layer of MDBs between the CIF Trust Fund Committee, which controls and 
disburses the funds, the direct access of national government to CIF resources is 
somewhat compromised. Although in the near term, this kind of facilitated access to 
finance may be necessary, because the national systems of many developing countries are 
not yet capable (or reliable) of administering huge sums of international climate financing 
(Brown et.al, 2010b); with a requirement to have the MDBs serve as intermediaries 
between the Funds and the recipients, the CIF may not help improve the capacity of 
national institutions. Referring to the close involvement of MDBs in climate finance and 
other development work, which can make developing countries over-reliant on these 
institutes at the expense of improving their national capacities, Neil Bird suggested the 
idea of working out an ―exit strategy‖ for MDBs (personal communication, November 
12
th
, 2010). In fact, given the long life lines of these funded projects, the CIF may 
prolong the incapacity of national institutions to handle climate finance.  
 
Second, the relationship between the MDBs and pilot countries and the extent to which 
developing countries assume leadership positions in the CIF process are ambiguous at 
best. It is not clear whether the MDBs will have an equal, greater, or lesser influence in 
the design and implementation of CIF programs and projects. The initial country 
assessments and the development of national country strategies, although are country-led 
processes, closely involve the MDBs. In fact, the PPCR recommends that pilot countries 
assign an equal partnership role to their partner MDBs in the development of the program 
or a lead administrative role for the PPCR funds (CIF, 2009d). The MDBs, therefore, are 
able to cast significant influence over these processes. The question is that given the 
influence of MDBs, will the priorities of these development partners override those of the 
client countries? While it is too early to make any conclusions, the concerns that the 
MDBs can use CIF resources to further their own agendas are not completely misguided. 
Because the CIF exploit co-financing opportunities with other development partners, 
efforts can be made to integrate CIF projects with those envisioned in MDB country 
strategies. In this way, CIF programs are not only country-owned, but also MDB-owned. 





can limit the ability of client countries to use CIF resources in their best interest. One way 
to prevent undermining the ability of developing countries in this way is to properly 
define power relation between the recipient countries and the MDBs and CIF (Ballesteros 
et.al, 2010a). In particular, the recipients must be able to more formally design and 
approve the final programs and projects that are implemented. Furthermore, requirements 
to demonstrate the country-ownership of individual programs (i.e. are they in line with 
national priorities and do they reflect national circumstances) can also be mandated.    
 
A final drawback of involving multiple MDBs in the CIF process is the lack of 
consistency it produces. MDBs are granted freedom to implement, monitor and report 
progress of CIF projects and programs using their individual operational procedures and 
guidelines. This makes it difficult to compare and generate lessons from programs 
implemented by different MDBs. Because the CIF aim to generate lessons from these 
pilot initiatives, the lack of consistency in the operations of the MDBs can be 
problematic. In addition, without an oversight mechanism of the CIF Trust Fund 
Committee, giving such liberties to the MDBs will mean that unfair or ineffective aid 
practices (lack of national ownership, complex bureaucratic procedures, imposition of 
unfair conditionalities) by MDBs may prevail. This will be at odds with the CIF efforts of 
adopting some measures of aid effectiveness, like country-ownership and leadership. 
Therefore, the CIF Trust Fund Committee should enforce a more rigorous and consistent 
accountability requirement on the partnering MDBs.    
 
Time Dimensions in Climate Policy  
 
An interview with Neil Bird revealed an important note about the innate feature of 
climate change as a long-term public policy concern (personal communication, 
November 12
th
, 2010). This is unlike conventional international development, to which 
comparably shorter time perspectives are applied during planning stages (for example, 
the focus on achieving the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 has tended to 
condense time scale). With a significant managerial role in climate finance, MDBs are 
bidding for a much stronger and longer role in recipient countries, which should be 
questioned. Specifically, will climate funds administered or implemented by MDBs 
prevent capacity development of national institutes in developing countries? While 
national institutes may not have the capacity yet to manage significant flows of climate 
funds, there are concerns that the stronghold of MDBs in developing countries will only 
discourage countries to build their own capacity in this regard. 
 
In relation to this, Ari Huhtala, the Senior Environmental Specialist, Climate Change 
Team at the World Bank (personal communication, November 10
th
, 2010) claimed that 
the Bank is keen about countries building capacities of national implementing entities in 
developing countries so that they can access funds directly. Although it is not clear how 
the Bank will improve national capacities by micro-managing all financial transactions, it 








Knowledge Sharing Potential  
 
The CIF state that one of their aims is to generate lessons for the climate finance 
community, including UNFCCC, by piloting transformational and scaled-up responses to 
climate change. Specifically for the purpose, they have designed the partnership forum, 
which is held annually for stakeholders to share their experiences with the CIF. This is a 
positive development, since the international community is in need of knowledge sharing 
forums like this.  
 
6.3 Governance Issues 
 
With CIF, MDBs are departing from their conventional practice towards a new approach 
to governance – one in which power is divided equally among participating developed 
and developing countries. Yet, the CIF reside in a ―donor-oriented environment‖ 
(Ballesteros et.al, 2010a) –i.e.  the World Bank, where largest share of power is in the 
hands of largest contributor to the institute. Will the dominant power structures that 




Abiding by the principle of equality, the Trust Fund Committees (TFC) of the CIF 
allocate equal seats to both developed and developing countries, which are the decision-
making members in the TFC. Moreover, the CIF also extend memberships to a MDB and 
a World Bank official, as well as representatives from civil societies and private sector, 
thereby improving the representativeness of various stakeholders in its governing bodies. 
These are all positive characteristics that have been championed by many NGOs and 
developing country leaders. Nevertheless, there are some issues of concern. The first 
issue is regarding the set-up of the governance structure. Although developed and 
developing countries are allocated equal number of seats (CIF makes provisions to adjust 
the number of seats for recipient countries to always match it with the number for donor 
countries, in any situation when the number of interested donors drops), the Adaptation 
Fund has offered a more appealing arrangement, which allocate more seats to the 
developing countries, reflecting on their sheer majority in the COP, as well as their 
different adaptation needs, level of economic development, and geographic distribution. 
Although the CIF are not the UNFCCC‘s financial mechanism, they are creating lessons 
to inform a future financial mechanism. The arrangement of the CIF, as compared to the 
Adaptation Fund seems like a regressive step.  
 
Representation of all Relevant Stakeholders  
 
An additional fault with the seat allocation in Trust Fund Committee is that it is not 
representative of all countries and stakeholders involved in the climate process. The Trust 
Fund Committee selects only those developed and developing country members that are 
participating in the CIF process. Small donor countries, which are unable to make the 
minimum contributions are kept from participating in the process. Likewise, developing 





involvement) do not participate in the programs and are deprived from receiving 
significant proportion of climate monies. The developing countries are selected based on 
the recommendations from the Expert Group Committee. However, donor countries did 
not completely adhere to the list provided by the experts while inviting recipient 
countries (CIF, 2009a & CIF, n.d.b). The final reasoning for selecting the current mix of 
recipient countries is still unknown.  
 
The composition of only a handful of developed and developing countries has both pros 
and cons. On one hand, this permits each individual member, whether developing or 
developed, to be more influential during CIF deliberations as compared to during 
UNFCCC negotiations (Richard Klein, personal communications, January 19
th
, 2011). 
Nevertheless, this also makes the process exclusive as it does not have representation of 
all developing countries and relevant stakeholders. This limits the ability of CIF to 
explore and respond to the diverse set of climate threats and opportunities facing 
developing countries and affected communities. Furthermore, the countries in the TFC 
have volunteered to participate as CIF pilots. Therefore, it can be speculated that these 
countries may not be affected by and overlook some of the design flaws of the CIF. 
Because of such a governance arrangement, the CIF‘s ability to generate lessons for the 
international community is reduced.   
 
MDB and World Bank Representation  
 
A unique aspect of the CIF governance structure is that there is representation of a MDB 
and World Bank officials. While the representatives of the World Bank and other MDBs 
are non-voting members, they attend all the sessions, including the exclusive executive 
sessions, which observer organizations (including UN and NGOs) don‘t have access to. 
Because decision is made on consensus, even as non-voting members, the MDB and 
World Bank representatives can influence the decision-making process significantly. This 
raises a related question, which CIF governance documents fail to clarify – what is 
division of power between the voting and non-voting members of the CIF Trust Fund 
Committee, when decision is taken on consensus. Furthermore, the CIF also do not 
specify what happens if consensus can not be reached among the Trust Fund Committee 
members.     
 
Consensus Decision Making  
 
Decision-making in the CIF only happens on the basis of consensus. While consensus is 
rightly hailed as a fair decision-making mechanism, in situations when there is a large 
number of stakeholders and a diversity of opinions, like during climate change 
negotiations of the COP, consensus decision-making can impede progress. From the 
interviews (Arastoo Khan, personal communication, January 28
th
,  2011 & Anonymous, 
personal communication, January 10
th
, 2011), it seems that so-far there has been little 
trouble using this mechanism. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that in a consensus 
process, any dis-consenting member can essentially veto a decision. This is what 
happened when the US decided to place a condition on its contributions to the CTF that it 





the CIF governance arrangements must be reformed to contain voting processes when 
consensus fails. Also, in consensus decision-making, care must also be exercised that the 
opinions of a particular member are not suppressed or wrongly manipulated. The CIF can 
assure this by being more transparent in their decision-making processes, which can be 
achieved easily by involving observers in all their meetings, including executive sessions.    
 
Extent of Observer Participation  
 
Another feature of the CIF is the involvement of observers in the meetings of Trust Fund 
Committee. The inclusion of different and relevant civil society and private sector 
members is a significant advancement on the conventional decision-making arrangements 
of the development banks, which happen behind close doors and have comparatively 
lesser transparency. The PPCR has attempted to include a representative of the 
Adaptation Fund in its Trust Fund Committee (as of now, its Farrukh Iqbal Khan). This is 
again a commendable step, and can enhance the coordination of efforts between the 
UNFCCC‘s Adaptation Fund and the CIF.  
 
Observers have ability to request agenda items, invite experts to speak on particular 
issues and make verbal interventions during Trust Fund Committee meetings. In this way, 
they can be influential in informing the process and decisions taken by the Trust Fund 
Committee. However, the scope of the observer participation is still limited to some 
degree.  Specifically, observers can not observe ―executive sessions‖ where investment 
plans are discussed and finalized. Recently, however, the civil society and private sector 
members expressed their frustrations over this practice and noted that their technical 
expertise and significant knowledge and experience can benefit the discussions on the 
investment plans (Nakhooda, 2010). Accordingly, since October 2009, the observers are 
allowed to participate in MDB presentations of the investment plans and offer their 
comments there; however the ―executive sessions‖, where the plans are finalized still 
remain sealed to the observers. Opening executive sessions to observers would not only 
allow CIF to further benefit from the expertise of the observers, but also make the process 
more transparent. Additionally, because many of the observers represent different 
stakeholders, observer participation in executive session would make executive sessions 
more inclusive and ensure (to a greater degree) that the programs and plans endorsed by 


















With USD 6.1 billion in pledged funds, the CIF are currently the largest channel of 
multilateral resources for climate change. The money is to be used to fund ―live 
experiments‖ through four different trusts to generate important lessons in climate 
financing. One of these focal areas is adaptation, which receives close to USD one 
billion. The funding for adaptation will be channeled through the Pilot Program for 
Climate Resilience which provides funds for developing national strategies and 
investment plans for carbon-resilient development in participating countries. These 
strategies are developed through country leadership and in partnership with one or more 
MDBs working in the country.  
 
The sum is substantial, but whether its use will be so too is uncertain. With a few 
commendable changes in its governance structure, which is noticeably different from the 
conventional decision-making structure of Bretton Woods organizations, the international 
community is keenly waiting for the outcomes of these live experiments. In this spirit, it 
is also useful to examine the opportunities and challenges for adaptation to climate 
change for the CIF as compared to the UNFCCC.  
 
To analyze the latter research question, document analysis and interviews were conducted 
to generate information on what the needs of adaptation finance are and how the CIF and 
the UNFCCC address adaptation. From the information gathered, a number of funding, 
institutional and governance challenges and opportunities for adaptation financing under 
the CIF became apparent. The division between these three issues is purely meant for 
organizational purposes; in fact the linkages between these three issues are much too 
obvious. Each institute allocates authority among important stakeholders differently, 
which reflects their history, purpose and political disposition. This influences the manner 
in which they create and resolve the different funding problems relevant to adaptation 
financing. A number of conclusions about each of these issues can be made. 
 
7.1 Funding Issues 
 
The CIF have risen in the absence of an agreed definition (or baseline) for accounting for 
new and additional finance under the UNFCCC. This is specifically not a fault of the 
CIF, but that of the COP, who are in charge of setting and agreeing on principles of aid 
mobilization and transfer. However, the CIF are indirectly adding fuel to the distrust 
between developed and developing countries with regards to additionality of funds. A 
large chunk of climate aid is being channeled through the CIF, specifically for the 
purposes of meeting UNFCCC requirements (or that of agreements that have emerged in 
a COP setting, like the Copenhagen Accord). By granting liberty to donor countries to 
abide by their own definition of additionality, the CIF are only encouraging some donors 
to divert ODA resources toward climate change. This is fundamentally at odds with the 
UNFCCC‘s requirement of providing non-Annex I Parties with new and additional 






Another unsolved problem is the inadequacy and unpredictability of funds. While it can 
be argued that the CIF are by nature a short-term endeavor, meant to only produce 
lessons in climate finance, the manner in which climate funds are garnered will prolong 
the unpredictability and inadequacy of funds. Specifically, CIF contributions are made on 
a voluntary basis, just like most of the UNFCCC funds (with the noble exception of the 
Adaptation Fund). Voluntary contributions means that the funds in CIF are unpredictable, 
and their renewal and flow may be contingent upon various donor conditions. Here again, 
CIF are only repeating the past mistakes of the UNFCCC funds. Voluntary contributions 
grant significant power to the contributing countries, and can obstruct from implementing 
new and effective ways of generating and disbursing resources. It has been argued many 
times that contributions towards climate change must not be voluntary, because climate 
change is an environmental justice issue – a view that is also broadly endorsed by the 
UNFCCC.   
 
Other sources of financing, namely taxation of international transport and financial 
transactions and carbon markets are being advocated by many experts (as the UN‘s 
AWG-LCA report confirms), avoid this problem, and it would have been good to see the 
World Bank create experience with these sources.  
 
To some extent, CIF can generate new lessons by achieving significant leveraging ratio 
by partnering with development banks and the private sector. Raising sources from these 
two avenues has also traditionally been the main forte of the World Bank. In relation to 
this, however, there are few concerns that must be addressed. Amidst a lack of set 
definition for new and additional, new questions about whether funds from private sector 
and development banks will count towards contributions from individual countries for 
fulfilling their UNFCCC obligations are raised, and need to be addressed. In addition, 
there are limitations to the private sector‘s involvement in climate finance, since they are 
mainly profit-driven. This is especially an important concern for adaptation financing, 
which intrinsically creates local (and perhaps long-term) benefits for the community with 
smaller profit margins for its investors. In light of this, developed countries should not 
shoulder off their responsibilities on the private sector; public sources will continue to be 
an important source of climate funds.  
 
Just like financial sources, financial instruments have important implications for the 
recipient countries. There is a strong argument that climate finance, especially for 
adaptation, must be disbursed in forms of grants, not loans. This is especially critical for 
adaptation, because of small profit margins of adaptation programs, the lack of financial 
capacity and the intensity of climate impacts on the most vulnerable countries, which 
require international adaptation funds. On the other hand, it is argued that given the cost 
of climate change and the rising income and emissions of some developing countries, 
other financial instruments should be deployed for climate change. In any case, there is a 
need for more information to better match financial instruments with the needs of 
recipient countries (for example, which countries and programs can be supported by 
loans, and which ones should be supported by grants). The CIF may be able to generate 







However, there are some issues with the use of loans that the CIF has failed to address. 
The CIF provide loans for adaptation, albeit at highly concessional terms. In his 
interview, Aarastoo Khan, additional secretary at the Ministry of Finance, Bangladesh 
and a member of the PPCR subcommittee sounded quite positive about the PPCR funds, 
pointing to the 75% grant element of the loans and the 40 year pay-back period (personal 
communications, January 2011). Despite his optimism, only the future, when the impacts 
of PPCR program become visible, will tell whether the CIF loans encumber developing 
countries with international debt, or provide timely and necessary assistance to some of 
the most vulnerable countries.  
 
At this stage, what would have helped the international community determine the 
suitability of loans to adaptation finance is the information on the terms and conditions of 
the loans. Unfortunately, the CIF do not disclose the specific terms and conditions of 
theur financial arrangements with particular countries. However, to generate lessons for 
the UNFCCC and to demonstrate fair use of climate funds, the CIF must be more 
transparent in this regard. They must make available to the civil societies and developing 
countries the terms and conditions and proportions of the loans that are disbursed to 
recipient countries. They must also, as much is possible, highlight the terms and 
conditions of private sector investment in recipient countries (which are even more 
covertly kept from the international community). 
  
In other ways, CIF are experimenting with good parameters of aid effectiveness. Namely, 
with programmatic approaches and the provision of national ownership, the CIF can 
generate useful lessons for future adaptation financing. The success of the PPCR will 
depend partially on the extent of stakeholder participation in the constructing climate 
resilience strategies and investment plans. Developing countries should not only be 
encouraged to engage relevant ministries in the planning process, but also representatives 
of vulnerable communities.  
 
7.2 Institutional Issues 
 
The emergence of the CIF at this time in the climate negotiations - when the Adaptation 
Fund has been established with many features that were strongly fought for by many 
developing countries and NGOs, and when the financial mechanism for the UNFCCC is 
still to be negotiated by the COP – seems intrusive to the negotiation process. Given the 
similarity in the way the GEF and the CIF have emerged – both being first proposed 
during ministerial meetings of the World Bank, just before an important negotiation on a 
financial mechanism, and with significant resources (and political support) from donor 
countries – the concern that the CIF may undermine UNFCCC‘s negotiations on a new 
financial entity of the Convention is not misplaced. The World Bank has already secured 
a position as an interim trustee of the planned Green Fund.  
 
In comparison with the Adaptation Fund, the CIF are at least a step behind. With greater 
representation, more transparency, a larger involvement of the civil society organizations 





of managing a situation when consensus between Parties can not be reached), the 
governance arrangements of the Adaptation Fund are much more equitable than that of 
CIF. The Adaptation Fund also provides recipients direct access to its resources base for 
projects and programs that they plan on their own. In contrast, recipients can access 
resources only through a MDB in the CIF. Recipient countries are also free to appoint 
implementing and executing entities, as long as they meet certain fiduciary requirements 
of the Adaptation Fund Board. Unlike this, MDBs implement programs for which CIF 
funds are used. Many would have liked to see these features of Adaptation Fund become 
more prominent in the future climate regime. However, with a much larger resource base 
and a different governance structure and funding arrangement, the CIF may be able to 
promote their less balanced governance and less effective funding standards on the future 
climate mechanism. 
 
The CIF allot a chief role to Multilateral Development Banks as implementing entities of 
its funds. In fact, the involvement of MDBs is so strong that the investment plans for CIF 
are co-owned by recipient country and MDBs, so that their programs in recipient 
countries can be accordingly coordinated. This could be a good development as it permits 
development banks to align their country strategies with climate change responses. On 
the other hand, it could decrease the emphasis on climate change activities; MDBs may 
be prompted to just use CIF resources to further their own agenda in a country, without 
giving due to consideration to climate change impacts. Without a strong cooperation 
between all the relevant country stakeholders and the MDBs, there is a chance that the 
development banks could superimpose their ideas on how investment plans should be 
constructed. They may also try to increase their roles in implementing programs, at the 
expense of building the capacity of national institutes from doing so. Finally, without any 
standard approach for conducting operations, it can be difficult to extract lessons from the 
use of CIF resources. Therefore, it is crucial that the MDBs remain transparent in their 
operations, including during consultations with the pilot countries and implementation of 
their programs. Also, a special effort must be made by the pilot countries and the MDBs 
to include representatives of vulnerable communities in the planning process.  
 
Given the plurality of institutes for climate finance, and given that the MDBs and the CIF 
may assume a more integral role in funding response activities to climate change, there is 
a need to legally tie these institutes to the UNFCCC. In particular, all climate finance 
institutes must be made accountable to the COP, so the primacy of UNFCCC is legally 
enforced. This will also ensure that ultimately, it will be the UNFCCC mandate (of the 
Convention and the subsequent Accords and Protocols) that would be supported through 
funds from donor countries. The parameters of institutional legitimacy, outlined in Figure 
6.3, can be used to set standards for climate financing institutes. For example, all climate 
finance institutes must be provided with guidance from the COP and may be subjected to 
regular monitoring; the governance structures of these institutes must share power 
equally between donors and recipients; function in a transparent manner; and involve a 








7.3 Governance Issues 
 
The CIF has many features in its governance structure that are new and progressive 
development on the conventional decision-making structure of development banks. In 
particular, equal share of seats between the developed and developing countries and 
participation of observers (and in the case of PPCR, a member of the Adaptation Fund 
Board) are positive developments that make the governance structure much more 
equitable. Still, in comparison, the Adaptation Fund Board has a far greater 
representation of all Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and many more observers.  
 
Observer participation in the CIF governance is a positive development; however, there is 
room for improvement here as well. Given that observers can represent various 
stakeholders (including vulnerable communities) and offer sound technical expertise, 
they should be granted equal access in the CIF boards as other members. In particular, 
they should be able to sit in executive sessions, where investment plans are finalized.    
 
Another aspect of the governance structure that can be improved is the decision making 
rules. There is no set protocol on how to act in case consensus can not be reached during 
Committee meetings (except for postponement or withdrawal of the proposal). Here, 
voting criteria, similar to that of Adaptation Fund, could become useful. 
 
7.4 Final Remarks 
 
Some of the strengths and weaknesses of the CIF are summarized in Table 7.1 below. It 
is still too early to tell whether the CIF will be overall a positive or negative experience 
for climate finance, because the majority of the funds are not yet disbursed. However, 
this thesis concludes that on one hand there are several important opportunities for the 
CIF. With a significant resource base, the CIF can provide important lessons to future 
climate funds. They are also providing important experience to multilateral development 
banks, which can be important avenues for channeling climate finance (some of the 
development banks, most notably the World Bank, already play a strong role). The CIF 
are also experimenting with new methods of providing aid that are cheered by many 
experts, leaders, CSOs, like supporting mainstreaming of adaptation into national 
development strategies; promoting national-ownership of plans; and conducting country-
led, country-wide, multi-stakeholder surveys while developing national strategies.  
 
However, there are several challenges in the way of CIF. With only some developed and 
developing country members, that are not fully representative of the COP and arguably 
less balanced composition, the governance structure of the CIF is not as advanced as that 
of some of the UNFCCC funds, especially the Adaptation Fund. The Adaptation Fund 
that falls under the UNFCCC umbrella also has made progress in providing countries 
with direct access to resources, providing only grants for adaptation, streamlining access 
to its resources, and removing any unfair economic conditionalties tied with its resources. 
All these are improvements on the conventional use of resources for climate change. 
Unfortunately, these positive developments are not taken up by any of the CIF funds. 





concern that the CIF can induce a direct competition for funds with the UNFCCC, or may 
preempt the outcome of COP negotiations in 2012.  
 
In many other ways, the CIF are only promoting some of the weaknesses of the UNFCCC 
funds. Overall, the UNFCCC funds allocate more resources to mitigation than adaptation; 
the same trend continues in the CIF. Like the UNFCCC, the CIF rely heavily on 
voluntary donor contributions, and are therefore unable to collect adequate and 
predictable funds. Neither have the UNFCCC negotiations, nor the World Bank 
leadership been able to convince the donors to abide by a standard definition for new and 
additional funds, thereby allowing developed countries to divert funds from ODA. The 
UNFCCC funds have implemented the majority of its programs through multilateral 
institutes, some of which may indirectly tip the power balance towards developed 
countries, who are their largest shareholders (Muller, 2008). By contrast the Adaptation 
Fund provides the opportunity to access the funds directly through an accredited national 
agency; however, many developing countries are not able to avail this opportunity 
because of a lack of institutional capacity in these countries. CIF could have contributed 
usefully by building national capacities of individual countries to enable them to access 
resources directly through the Adaptation Fund or through its four trust funds. In 
addition, although the CIF are experimenting with larger leveraging ratios by partnering 
with development banks and private sector (this experience could generate important 
lessons for the UNFCCC funds), they are not experimenting with newer sources of 
finance, like carbon markets and taxes on international air and maritime transport.  
 
With a bulkier resource base, the CIF also raise questions of institutional interplay 
between the UNFCCC and CIF. Although CIF asserts the supremacy of the UNFCCC, 
they are not legally accountable to the COP for their actions. Given that many developed 
countries are fulfilling their commitments under the UNFCCC by channeling resources 
into the CIF trust funds, the CIF should have been made accountable to the COP. A legal 
relationship should have been drawn between them (through the likes of a Memorandum 
of Understanding) and CIF should have received guidance from, and provided regular 
reports to the COP on the activities it supports. This could have further enhanced the 
cooperation between the two institutes, coordinated climate change activities, and 
improved the quality and the relevance of the lessons generated by the CIF. If the CIF (or 

















Table 7.1: Some Strengths and Weaknesses of the Climate Investment Funds 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Substantial sum of money No mechanisms for determining 
additionality and adequacy, or 
ensuring predictability of funds 
Experimentation with country-
led and country-owned strategies 
No experimentation with innovative 
sources of climate finance 
Experimentation with 
programmatic approaches 
Lack of transparency on the terms 
and conditions of loans, and of the 
financing provided by the private 
sector 
Potential to reach high 
leveraging ratios 
No provision of direct access to 
resources 
Potential to generate useful 
lessons for international climate 
finance 
Provision of loans for adaptation 
 Inability to provide a balanced 
allocation of resources between 
mitigation and adaptation 
 No guidance from the COP, or any 
defined legal relationship to the 
COP  
 Limitations on the extent of 
observer participation 
 Not all COP members represented 
on the decision-making boards   
 
Referring back to claim made by some NGOs that the CIF are a World Bank‘s attempt to 
undermine global climate action, this statement can not be endorsed by this thesis as it 
stands. However, there are significant challenges standing in the way of CIF, particularly 
with regards to adaptation financing. Had the World Bank aligned its mandate more 
formally with the UNFCCC, in an attempt to identify and bridge the gaps in the current 
aid architecture for climate change, the CIF process would have perhaps be seen as less 
invasive. Currently, the CIF does repeat some of the shortcomings of UNFCCC funds, 
like inability to provide new, additional (to ODA), predictable funds which are divided in 
a balanced way between adaptation and mitigation. There is also perplexity over the legal 
relationship between the COP and CIF. The governance arrangements of the CIF are not 
as advanced as that of the Adaptation Fund Board. Significant power is also in the hands 
of donor-preferred institutes, i.e. the multilateral development banks, and there is little 
attempt to increase the capacity of national institutes in administering climate finance. 
There is also no experimentation with newer sources of climate finance, especially ones 
which are receiving strong enthusiasm from the international community (i.e. monitoring 
emissions from international transport to extract funds from these industries for climate 
change). There is some experimentation with generating private sources of finance; 
however, with insufficient transparency in the disbursal of funds, the effectiveness of this 






But with a substantial resource base, experimentation with country-led, programmatic 
approaches to design national strategies and investment plans for climate change, and 
arrangements to share experience with the international community, some good may 
come out of the funds. With a relatively balanced governance structure (with equal seats 
and votes for developed and developing countries and representation of civil society 
organizations), the CIF are a significant improvement on the conventional decision-
making structure of the World Bank. If the World Bank and other multilateral 
development banks are to assume a significant role in administering climate finance, such 
a governance arrangement would be a step in the right direction.  
 
In spite of the strengths and weaknesses of the CIF, time will be the true test of the CIF‘s 
success in providing for adaptation finance. The CIF projects and programs should be 
evaluated along a number of themes, as outlined below.  
 
Quality of the programs and projects supported by the CIF 
  Are adaptation programs supported by the PPCR sufficiently integrated into the 
country‘s development strategy?  
 Are they reflective of the concerns of the vulnerable communities and other 
important stakeholders affected by climate change? 
 
Influence of CIF on recipient countries 
 Are these countries accumulating more international debt? Are sufficient risk 
mitigation strategies in place?  
 
Evaluation of the multilateral development banks 
 How well have they administered climate finance?  
 Have they experimented with truly transformation strategies that are necessary to 
respond to climate change, or are they simply labeling old practices as climate 
strategies?  
 How different are the strategies of multilateral development banks and the 
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